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I. INTRODUCTION
When does resorting to random selection by casting lots
produce a just distribution or allocation of property?' Some
argue generally in support of casting lots, asserting that it
is a viable substitute for equal distribution of property. 2
1. Throughout this article, the term "property" is used in its broadest sense
and includes not only traditionally held notions of property but also an
expanded definition, broad enough to include the concept of dephysicalized
property. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth
Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV.
325 (1980). Professor Vandevelde discusses the "dephysicalization" of property
and the resultant broadening of property law to include valuable interests not
traditionally treated or considered as property. Professor Charles A. Reich
makes the case that government has emerged as a major source of wealth
thereby displacing "traditional forms of wealth-forms which are held as
private property." Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733
(1964). He concedes that "government largess" is not necessarily property and
also advocates for the recognition of an expansion of traditional notions of
private property to include a "new property." Id. According to Professor Reich,
this new and expanded understanding of property is important in safeguarding
individual liberty against government overreaching. Id. at 739, 787. John
Brigham arguably advocates for an even more expansive conception of property.
JOHN BRIGHAM, PROPERTY AND THE POLITICS OF ENTITLEMENT 39 (1990). He
observes that property claims generally concern citizen-held expectations that
are derived from promises made or obligations undertaken by government.
2. E.g., BARBARA GOODWIN, JUSTICE BY LOTTERY 93 (1992) (stating generally
that the lottery as an organizational principle "is a natural ally of democracy"
and could justifiably be used by government as part of its policy-making
process); Fred Hapgood, Chances of a Lifetime, 3 WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW
SOCIETY 37, 39 (1975) (stating that "[lJotteries are cheap, equitable, and
incorruptible (or can be made so with little effort)"); see also Metro Broad., Inc.
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of a lottery as part
of the Federal Communications Commission minority preference policy).
In enacting the lottery statute [47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(A)], Congress
explained the "current comparative hearing process" had failed to
produce adequate programming diversity and that "[t]he policy of
encouraging diversity of information sources is best served . . . by
assuring that minority and ethnic groups that have been unable to
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Others argue against casting lots, contending that it un-
dermines distributive justice. 3 This article considers in-
stances of casting lots from the nineteenth century4 to the
present 5 and explains why the latter view is the better view.
acquire any significant degree of media ownership are provided an
increased opportunity to do so." . . . Only in this way would "the
American pubic [gain] access to a wider diversity of information sources."
Id. at 590 (citations omitted).
3. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 313 (1990); GUIDO CALABRESI &
PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 42 (1978). In Wygant, plaintiffs, nonminority
teachers who were laid off pursuant to Article XII of the collective-bargaining
agreement between the Jackson Board of Education and the teachers' union,
claimed that they were laid off because of their race in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 270.
Article XII provided that teachers with the most seniority would be retained
and provided a racial preference for minority teachers so that in some
instances, minority teachers were retained while nonminority teachers with
greater seniority were laid off. Id. The Court held that the Board's plan violated
the Equal Protection clause as less intrusive means were available to achieve
the legitimate goal of racial equality. Id. at 274-76. Justice Marshall, writing for
the dissent, stated that Article XII was narrowly tailored to preserve the degree
of faculty integration that the school system managed to achieve through
affirmative action hiring policies adopted in the 1970s. Id. at 303, 309
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that determining layoffs by
casting lots would be an alternative to Article XII, but a less narrowly tailored
one. "A random system . . . would place every teacher in equal jeopardy,
working a much greater upheaval of the seniority hierarchy than that
occasioned by Article XII; it is not at all a less restrictive means of achieving the
Board's goal." Id. at 310.
4. E.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). Lotteries were
frequently employed when there was a need to sacrifice an individual in times
of extreme danger. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (E.D.
Penn. 1842) (No. 15,383) (discussing the virtue of the lot in admiralty situations
as a means of selecting an individual to be sacrificed in a perilous and
emergency situation); The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884)
(discussing the drawing of lots by starving sailors to determine who should be
the victim of cannibalism).
5. For example, lotteries are presently used to allocate resources such as
transportation rights for natural resources, entitlement to real property and
improvements, cellular licenses, admission into educational institutions,
employment opportunities, and immigration visas.
Lotteries are used to allocate rights to transport natural gas through limited
space in natural gas pipelines. E.g., Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v.
FERC, 315 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2003); PG&E Transmission v. FERC, 315 F.3d 383
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
The following cases provide information on the use of lotteries to allocate
"traditionally" recognized real and personal property rights. E.g., Brotherton v.
Point on Norman L.L.C., 577 S.E.2d 361 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003), reh'g denied, 582
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S.E.2d 28 (N.C. 2003) (discussing the drawing of numbers to determine the
order of selecting property lots in a subdivision); Gray v. Crotts, 293 S.E.2d 626
(N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (discussing the propriety of drawing lots to distribute real
property and improvements to siblings upon partition-in-kind); Lapeyrouse v.
Lapeyrouse, 729 So. 2d 682 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2801 (West 1986) governing the partition of community property and
subsection (d) in particular providing, in certain circumstances, for the drawing
of lots as a method of assigning assets).
In the cellular license and telecommunications context, lotteries are
sometimes used to allocate cellular rights among competing parties. See, e.g.,
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (discussing broadcast
telecommunications generally); Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (discussing cellular licenses).
For a discussion of education lotteries, see infra Part V.
Access to employment and to economic opportunities are sometimes decided
by lottery. See, e.g., Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep't, 253 F.3d 1288 (11th
Cir. 2001) (discussing use by fire department of random lottery to determine
which applicants would advance to second phase of the selection process);
Nappa Valley Publ'g Co. v. City of Calistoga, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (discussing ordinance allowing city to allocate certain defined newsrack
spaces by conducting random lottery when permit applications exceed number
of newsracks permitted at particular location); Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (discussing the drawing of lots for allocation of right to
distribute towing job when two or more wreckers arrive at the same time and
the owner of the vehicle to be towed has not requested a particular wrecker).
For a discussion of lotteries and diversity immigration visas, see, for
example, IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAw SOURCEBOOK ch. 6, pt. IV
(4th ed. 1994) (stating that random selection procedures in the form of a lottery
will be used to select among eligible candidates under the diversity immigration
program); Gonzalez v. INS, 353 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2003); Khan v. Ashcroft, No.
03C973, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17251 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2004) (stating that
selection through the purely random lottery process does not guarantee receipt
of a visa but merely establishes eligibility to receive an immigration visa). In
the context of diversity immigration visas, those selected by the lottery process
are entitled to enter the United States as "LPRs" (lawful permanent residents).
KuRZBAN, supra at ch. 6, pt. IV.A; see Bill Ong Hing, No Place for Angels: In
Reaction to Kevin Johnson, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 559, 589 (discussing how race
discrimination taints current United States immigration law as evidenced by
decisions regarding how to distribute lottery visas among competing countries).
Lotteries are also used as part of the electoral process. Recently, a mayoral
election was decided by use of dice. Utah Mayor Wins Re-Election by Dice, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 16, 2003, at A6:
With the roll of the dice and the flash of cameras, Mark Allen won a
third term as this city's mayor.
Allen and Challenger Robert Garside tied in a Nov. 4 election with
724 votes each. Under Utah law, tie votes must be decided by drawing
lots, which can mean anything from flipping a coin to drawing a name
out of a hat.
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The Antelope is one of the earliest United States
Supreme Court cases addressing distribution of property by
casting lots. 6 It chronicles a dispute over the allocation of
captured Africans as part of the international slave trade.
The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's recommenda-
tion of casting lots to decide competing claims of Portugal,
Spain, and the United States. Instead, the Court endorsed a
more individualized, merit-based assessment for determin-
ing competing property rights.7 The Antelope provides rare
insight into the Supreme Court's doctrinal approach to us-
ing weighted8 lotteries to settle complicated property dis-
putes. These insights are useful when debating the propri-
ety of distribution of property by casting lots.
The Court did not categorically reject casting lots.
Rather, the Court provided insights on why the distribution
of property by casting lots, while appearing impartial,
might mask important prior choices that cause distribution
conflicts. This masking effect renders government unac-
countable for creating distributive imbalances. 9  The
"We felt rolling dice was a more fair way to make a choice," city
recorder Shari Peterson said.
Both candidates said the race's outcome was fair.
Id. (emphasis added).
The obligation to participate in the draft is an instance of the use of lotteries
to distribute governmental burdens and responsibilities. See, e.g., GEORGE Q.
FLYNN, CONSCRIPTION AND DEMOCRACY: THE DRAFT IN FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN,
AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (2002).
6. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825) (discussing the arguments of
the various claimants and establishing their entitlement to Africans as property
and requiring designation by proof as opposed to casting lots as the mechanism
for making allocations); The Antelope, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 413 (1826) (clarifying
that designation by proof, not selection by lot, was required by the Court's 1825
decision); The Antelope, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 546 (1827) (discussing the number
of Africans to be delivered to the Spanish claimants and the number to be
delivered to the United States).
I do not use The Antelope to explore the rightness or wrongness of slavery;
rather, I use it to explore the weaknesses of the lottery as a distributive
mechanism.
7. For a full discussion of The Antelope's procedural history see infra Part II
and accompanying text and notes.
8. See infra Part III and accompanying text (discussing weighted lotteries).
9. See Leonard M. Fleck, Models of Rationing: Just Health Care Rationing: A
Democratic Decisionmaking Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597 (1992)
2005]
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Antelope illustrates why government should avoid the se-
duction of allocating property by casting lots. The lower
court's decision to allocate by casting lots was a choice to
avoid the accountability and transparency inherent in ac-
tively deciding the appropriate allocation. 10 The decision to
treat humans as property was assumed away at a time in
American history when an increasing number of citizens
had begun to criticize the institution of slavery." The
(discussing the masking impact); infra Parts III and IV (discussing and
providing examples of the masking impact).
10. See, e.g., GOODWIN, supra note 2, at 46-47. Common objections to
casting lots include:
1. The lottery neglects human need.
2. Lotteries ignore personal merit and desert.
3. Lotteries expose people to a high degree of risk and uncertainty.
4. Any non-trivial lottery is antithetical to personal freedom, and
reduces people's control over their own destiny.
5. The use of lottery to make a decision circumvents the processes of
rational thought and deliberation to which we, as human beings, are
committed, and of which we are proud.
6. Lottery allocation or decision-making undermines human dignity
and diminishes the individual by attacking the very basis of
individuality (that is, being considered as a person with attributes,
rather than a cipher, in the decision process).
7. Any socially or politically important lottery . . . undermines elite
and/or traditional sociopolitical structures and power bases.
8. Such a lottery also reduces the governors' control over the governed.
9. Lotteries unrealistically assume equality on the part of their
participants and tend to promote unmerited equality in their processes
and/or their outcomes.
Id.; see also CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3 (generally criticizing casting
lots to allocate governmental resources).
11. See, e.g., Frances Howell Rudko, Pause at the Rubicon, John Marshall
and Emancipation: Reparations in the Early National Period, 35 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 75, 75 (2001) ("Marshall's statements, both on and off the bench, reveal
that he hated the institution of slavery and considered it demeaning to both
slave and slave-owner."); Case of the Antelope otherwise the Ramirez and
Cargo, May 11, 1821 (Case of the Antelope); Vol. 103, Minute Book 1816-1823,
pp. 192-98 (Vol. 103, MB 1816-1823, pp. 192-98); Records of District Courts of
the United States, Record Group 21 (RG 21); National Archives and Records
Administration-Southeast Region (Atlanta) (NARA); Opinion of U.S. Supreme
Court, December 14, 1825 (Opinion of U.S. Supreme Court); Vol. 104 Minute
Book 1823-1834, pp.1 9 2 -9 8 (Vol. 104, MB 1823-1824, pp. 192-98); Records of
District Courts of the United States, Record Group 21 (RG 21); National
Archives and Records Administration-Southeast Region (Atlanta) (NARA)
(citing to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, referencing the lot
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Antelope is thus an excellent beginning point to consider
contemporary issues surrounding lotteries and questions of
distributive justice.
The significance of casting lots to distribute property is
not relegated to the past. 12 In recent years, courts have con-
sidered the legitimacy of casting lots to achieve distributive
justice in educational opportunities. 13 For example, in
Grutter v. Bollinger, the United States Supreme Court re-
jected the district court's suggestion of a lottery as a com-
ponent of the Michigan Law School's admission process.' 4
language and reversing the lower court opinion as to the part directing the
amount of restitution due the Spanish and Portuguese claimants).
12. See, e.g., supra note 5. When the lottery is mentioned, many people likely
think of the jury selection system as an example of the most prevalent use of
the lottery. For additional material on lotteries and the American jury system,
see, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, Choosing Representations by Lottery Voting,
93 YALE L.J. 1283 (1984) (discussing lotteries and democracy but more
particularly lotteries as part of the jury process); see also GOODWIN, supra note
2, at 79, 163-64 (discussing jury selection and lotteries):
The use of lotteries as a component of the jury selection system is
beyond the scope of this article. While many argue that the jury system
works efficiently and successfully, one would have to evaluate the
standard for measuring its success. For instance, does success
translate into high acquittal rates, high conviction rates, or the degree
of satisfaction of the jurors in their participation in the process, or is
success more a function of the jury composition? Under the jury
composition view, is a just lottery one that is representative of the
population it serves along lines of race, gender, ethnicity,
socioeconomics, and education; or, alternatively, is the preferred lottery
one that excludes all but the ideal citizen, the citizen who is wealthy,
highly educated, and a member of the majority class?
13. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich.
2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), affld, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (discussing
the possibility of a lottery system as a race-neutral admissions alternative for
law school); Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002) (upholding the legality of a black and of
a nonblack weighted lottery as part of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools
desegregation plan which focused on the use of magnet schools to achieve
racially balanced and integrated schools); Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist.,
306 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the use of lotteries weighted to consider
factors such as race, gender, language, socioeconomic status, and special
educational needs as part of the admissions process); Lynn Payer, Dutch
Choosing Medical Students by Lottery, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 30, 1978, at
3. The Netherlands weights its admission plan to favor applicants who have the
best grades. Neither the applicants nor the faculty are entirely pleased with the
consequences of the weighted lottery. Id.
14. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340. The Court stated:
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On the other hand, in Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education,'5 the Fourth Circuit critiqued the use of lot-
teries in magnet school 16 admissions processes as a means
of achieving integrated public schools and concluded that,
The District Court took the Law School to task for failing to consider
race-neutral alternatives such as "using a lottery system" . . . . But
[this] alternativeo would require a dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the
academic quality of all admitted students, or both.
The Law School's current admissions program considers race as one
factor among many, in an effort to assemble a student body that is
diverse in ways broader than race. Because a lottery would make that
kind of nuanced judgment impossible, it would effectively sacrifice all
other educational values, not to mention every other kind of diversity.
Id. But see Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d
949 (9th Cir. 2004), reh'g granted, vacated by 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005). The
court found that use of a randomized lottery, while "perhaps not palatable to
the electorate[,]" would produce racial diversity comparable to the racial
tiebreaking method currently used by the school district. Id. at 970. The court
was unpersuaded by the Grutter Court's criticism of lotteries and stated the
following:
Grutter rejected the plaintiffs' demand that the Law School consider a
lottery because such a program would necessarily diminish the quality
of its admitted students and might not produce adequate educational
diversity due to potential under-representation of various (not
necessarily racial) kinds of diversity in its limited applicant pool. Yet
as the dissent itself notes, the School District's adoption of a lottery is
subject to neither of these potential pitfalls ... (noting that in this case
"there is absolutely no competition or consideration of merit .... All
high school students must and will be placed in a Seattle public school.
The students' relative merit is irrelevant.").
Id. at 971 (footnote omitted).
15. 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002). Relatively
few cases ever receive Supreme Court review; thus, for most litigants, the circuit
courts practically serve as the courts of last resort. Thus, consideration of a recent
circuit court of appeals decision in the context of school lotteries is illuminating.
16. "Ordinarily, the term 'magnet school' refers to schools that confer unique
educational benefits and draw from a district-wide geographic base through a
lottery system." Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 263 F. Supp. 2d 209, 245 n.71 (D.
Mass. 2003), withdrawn, reh'g granted, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24662 (1st Cir.
Nov. 24, 2004). Sometimes though the term "magnet schools" simply refers to
neighborhood schools designed around a "theme" for the purpose of attracting
transfer students and thereby promoting integration. Id.; Belk, 269 F.3d at 336
('Magnet schools have the advantage of encouraging voluntary movement of
students within a school district in a pattern that aids desegregation on a
voluntary basis, without requiring extensive busing and redrawing of district
boundary lines."') (quoting Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 92 (1995)).
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given the existing consent decree, casting lots was not un-
constitutional. 17
My thesis is that casting lots frequently results in unjust
distributions of property.18 My critique has two parts. First,
casting lots is deceptive because, although lotteries purport
to be random, they are frequently preceded by nonrandom
decisions that result in important distributional effects that
the lottery masks. 19 Second, even if government acknowl-
edges that most lotteries are not completely random because
of nonrandom pre-lottery decisions, casting lots is often un-
fair because it does not account for individual merit and
characteristics such as need, fitness, desert, status, and posi-
tion.20 Essentially, casting lots obscures the decision to avoid
making difficult choices.
Part II explores The Antelope case. It focuses on the
critical aspect of the courts' opinions-the divergence be-
tween the circuit court and the United States Supreme
Court on the propriety of casting lots to distribute the
Antelope Africans among claimants with competing prop-
erty interests. Part III discusses casting lots in the context
of first- and second-order decisions which are pre-lottery
decisions that alter the lottery's results. Using examples
from The Antelope, Part III demonstrates how the use of
first- and second-order decisions, in combination with cast-
ing lots, masks the choice to avoid responsible and trans-
parent government decision-making. Part IV analyzes the
role of casting lots in light of distributive justice. It uses ex-
amples from The Antelope to explore the distributive justice
consequences of casting lots to make important decisions.
Part V examines a recent Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision, Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
to discuss casting lots as a tool to desegregate public
schools. It explores present-day uses of casting lots and ap-
plies a distributive justice framework in considering the
ability of casting lots to yield just allocations. Part VI dis-
cusses alternatives to casting lots. It emphasizes the impor-
tance of transparent and responsible decision-making and
17. Belk, 269 F.3d at 399.
18. See infra notes 202-03 and accompanying text (discussing when lotteries
might be appropriate).
19. See infra Part III.A (discussing weighted lotteries and the effects of
weighting).
20. See infra Part III.A.
2005]
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why casting lots generally does not further these important
goals. Part VII concludes by summarizing clear policies that
disfavor casting lots and reinforces ways to more predicta-
bly achieve distributive justice.
II. AN EARLY CASE OF CASTING LOTS: A RETROSPECTIVE ON
THE ANTELOPE CASE
The Antelope was a schooner designed to transport
slaves during the flourishing international slave trade in
the early 1800s. 21 The events leading to The Antelope litiga-
tion began in 1819 with another slave ship, the Columbia.22
Sailing under a Venezuelan commission,23 the Columbia
and its American captain, Simon Metcalf,24 arrived on the
21. The Antelope ship was also known as the General Ramirez. See, e.g.,
Frances Sorrell, Vice Consul v. 130 African Slaves, August 12, 1820 (Sorrell v.
130 African Slaves); Vol. B23/36B026, Mixed Cases 1790-1860, F-7, Folder U.S.
or Span. Consul. v. Brig. Antelope or General Ramirez v. Africans 1820, F-7,
Folder 1 (Vol. B23/36B026, MC 1790-1860, F-7, Folder 1); Div. Savannah,
Georgia; Off. Circuit Courts; Record Group 21, United States District Court (RG
21); National Archives and Records Administration-Southeast Region
(Atlanta) (NARA); United States v. Charles Mulvey, Vice Consul of Spain and
Others, Claimants of Africans part of the Cargo of the Antelope or Ramirez, The
Same v. Frances Sorrell, Vice Consul of Portugal, February 1825 (United States
v. Mulvey); Vol. B23136B026, Mixed Cases 1790-1860, F-7, Folder U.S. or Span.
Consul. v. Brig. Antelope or General Ramirez v. Africans 1820, F-7, Folder 1
(Vol. B23/36B026, MC 1790-1860, F-7, Folderi); Div. Savannah, Georgia; Off.
Circuit Courts; Record Group 21, United States District Court; Record Group 21
(RG 21); National Archives and Records Administration-Southeast Region
(Atlanta) (NARA); Case of the Antelope otherwise the Ramirez and Cargo, May
11, 1821; Vol. 103, Minute Book 1816-1823, p. 192; Div. Savannah, Georgia; Off.
Circuit Courts; Records Group 21, United States District Court; National
Archives and Records Administration-Southeast Region (Atlanta) (NARA);
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED AFRICANS
IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 1 (1997).
Spanish and Portuguese seafarers initiated the international African slave
trade near the beginning of the fifteenth century. ROBERT B. SHAW, A LEGAL
HISTORY OF SLAVERY 208 (1991).
Incidentally, this Article uses the spelling "Sorrell" when referring to the
Vice Consul whose name appears in some of the Antelope cases. Some original
documents contain an alternative spelling, "Sorrel."
22. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 27 (stating that the Columbia was formerly
the Baltimore and later, while at sea, changed her name to the Arraganta).
23. Case of the Antelope; Vol. 103, MB, p. 192; RG 21; Atlanta.
24. Sorrell v. 130 African Slaves; Vol. B23/36B026; RG 21; Atlanta; see
NOONAN, supra note 21, at 26-28 (stating that the crew of the Columbia swore
before a justice of the peace that they were not American citizens).
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west coast of Africa in January 1820.25 While at sea, the
ship's crew forcibly boarded Portuguese slave vessels and
an American slave vessel, the Exchange, of Bristol, Rhode
Island.26 The Exchange contained approximately twenty-
five Africans who were being held as slaves. 27 The
Columbia took Africans from these ships, including all of
those on board the Exchange.2s
Near the time of the Columbia's exploits, the Antelope
was anchored at the port of Cabinda, also on the west coast
of Africa. 29 The Antelope had purchased, boarded, and
chained a number of Africans when the Columbia, then
flying a Spanish flag, entered Cabinda on March 23, 1820.30
The Columbia "fell in with the Antelope having a number of
slaves on board and made prize of her as a Spanish ves-
sel.' '31 The Columbia also captured a Portuguese vessel in
Cabinda and transferred its Africans to either the Columbia
or the Antelope.32
The two ships traveled together until the Columbia was
wrecked and stranded off the coast of Brazil.33 After the
Columbia was wrecked, the Antelope took on board survivors,
both African and non-African. 34 With its human cargo, cap-
tured from Spanish, Portuguese, and American vessels, 35 the
25. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 27.
26. Case of the Antelope; Vol. 103, MB, p. 192; RG 21; Atlanta; NOONAN,
supra note 21, at 26-28.
27. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 28; SHAW, supra note 21, at 218.
28. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 28; SHAW, supra note 21, at 218. See Case of the
Antelope; Vol. 103, p. 192; MB 1816-1823; RG 21, NARA--Southeast Region (Atl.).
29. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 28.
30. See id. at 29.
31. Case of the Antelope; Vol. 103, MB, p. 192; RG 21; Atlanta; see also
Sorrell v. 130 African Slaves; Vol. B23/36B026, MC 1790-1860, F-7, Folder 1;
RG 21; NARA-Southeast Region (Atl.); NOONAN, supra note 21, at 28-30.
32. See NOONAN, supra note 21, at 29.
33. See id.
34. Id; Sorrell v. 130 African Slaves; Vol. B23/36B026, MC 1790-1860, F-7,
Folder 1; RG 21; Atlanta.
35. "Charles Harris, the former Mayor of Savannah and present Chairman
of the Finance Committee of the city, Thomas Usher Pulaski Charlton, the
present Mayor of Savannah-acted for the King of Spain or, more accurately,
for Charles Mulvey, Vice Consul in Savannah of the King of Spain." NOONAN,
supra note 21, at 42.
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Antelope sailed for the "Hole-in-the-Wall," a passage leading
to the eastern coast of Florida.3 6 Her destination was certain
to be a slave market in the United States. 37
Harris and Charlton claimed that 150 Africans on board the Antelope were,
at the time of capture, the property of Spain. See Monition, Chs. Mulvey, Vice
Consul v. 150 African Slaves, August 1, 1820 (Mulvey v. 150 African Slaves);
Vol. B23/36B026, Mixed Cases 1790-1860, F-7, Folder U.S. or Span. Consul. v.
Brig. Antelope or General Ramirez v. Africans 1820, F-7, Folder 1 (Vol.
B23/36B026, MC 1790-1860, F-7, Folder 1); Div. Savannah, Georgia; Off. Circuit
Courts; Record Group 21, United States District Court (RG 21); National
Archives and Records Administration-Southeast Region (Atlanta) (NARA);
United States v. Mulvey; Vol. B23/36B026, MC 1790-1860, F-7, Folderi; RG 21;
Atlanta (Spain claims a right in 150 of the Africans aboard the Antelope);
NOONAN, supra note 21, at 43.
James Morrison and John C. Nicoll represented the Portuguese claimants in
the name of Portugal's Vice Consul, Francis Sorrell. NOONAN, ANTELOPE, supra
note 20, at 42-43. Morrison claimed 130 or more Africans on board the Antelope
as property of subjects of Portugal. See Sorrell v. 130 African Slaves; Vol.
B23136B026, MC 1790-1860, F-7, Folder 1; RG 21; Atlanta.
John Smith, captain of the Antelope, and William Brunton, also of the
Antelope, testified before the district court that twenty-five Africans were taken
from the American vessel the Exchange NOONAN, supra note 21, at 54-55.
Brunton further testified that all were boys or men. Id.; see also Deposition of
Thomas Bradshaw, John Jackson v. The Antelope or Ramirez, C. Mulvey v. 150
Africans, Francis Sorrell v. 130 Africans, February 15, 1821; Vol. 103, Minute
Book 1816-1823; Div. Savannah, Georgia; Off. Circuit Courts; Records Group
21, United States District Court; National Archives and Records
Administration-Southeast Region (Atlanta) (stating that the number of
Africans taken from the Exchange numbered twenty-four or twenty-five); SHAW,
supra note 21, at 218 (stating that twenty-five Africans were removed from the
Exchange).
36. See NOONAN, supra note 21, at 30.
37. Id.
The two vessels [the Columbia and the Antelope] . . .proceeded to the
coast of Brazil obviously with a view to effect a clandestine sale of the
slaves, but [with] the Arraganta [Columbia] being shipwrecked, and
her captain drowned, the Antelope proceeded northwardly, and after
vainly attempting to sell the slaves among the islands at length came
off the coast of Florida for the same object, for it could be for no other.
While off that coast she was [noticed] to the revenue cutter [Dallas] as
a vessel of piratical appearance and Capt. Jackson, furnished with a
reinforcement of soldiers, proceeded to attack her. On boarding her and
finding her full of slaves and under command of a man holding an
American protection, tho' professing to act as a [commissioned] cruiser
of Antigas, he took [possession] of her and brought her into an
American port for adjudication.
Case of the Antelope; Vol. 103, p. 192-93; MB 1816-1823; RG 21, Atlanta. In
fact, "[bly Section 7 of the Act of 1807, 'hovering on the coasts' within the
jurisdictional limits of the United States was specifically defined, in respect to
2005] CASTING LOTS
Captain John Jackson of the American revenue cutter
Dallas encountered the Antelope off the coast of Florida.38
Suspecting it to be a slave-smuggling vessel, he boarded the
Antelope and, after "finding her laden with slaves, com-
manded by officers who were citizens of the United States,
with a crew who spoke English, brought her in for adjudica-
tion. . ." on June 29, 1820. 39 The Antelope contained at least
280 Africans, as well as its crew, at the time of its ultimate
capture.40
Both Spain and Portugal claimed an interest in a por-
tion of the Antelope Africans on behalf of their subjects. 41
The United States opposed their claims on behalf of the Af-
ricans, never asserting a property interest in them.42 The
slave ships, as an illegal act by itself comprising slave trading." SHAW, supra
note 21, at 224 n.18.
38. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 124 (1825); Case of the Antelope;
Vol. 103, p. 192-93; MB 1816-1823; RG 21; Atlanta.
39. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 124.
The day before, the Dallas under the command of John Jackson had
been at St. Mary's, Georgia. An informant in St. Augustine reported
the appearance of a suspicious ship off the coast. Jackson proceeded to
Amelia Island and took on twelve soldiers armed with muskets. Early
in the morning of June 29 the Dallas sighted the Antelope between
Amelia Island and the Florida coast. The Antelope was sailing north.
The Dallas gave chase. The Antelope was overtaken in midafternoon.
NOONAN, supra note 21, at 31. Captain Jackson first brought the Antelope into
St. Mary's, Georgia and ultimately delivered her crew and cargo, including the
African slaves, to Savannah, Georgia. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 32. See
generally KENNETH C. RANDALL, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM 169-70 (1990) (discussing generally universal
jurisdiction over slave trading).
40. Sorrel v. 130 African Slaves; Vol. B23/36B026, MC 1790-1860, F-7,
Folder 1; RG 21; Atlanta; NOONAN, supra note 21, at 29-30; SHAw, supra note
21, at 218; but see Case of the Antelope; Vol. 103, p. 192; MB 1816-1823; RG 21;
Atlanta (stating that there were about 250 Africans aboard the Antelope upon
its boarding and capture by Dallas cutter, commanded by Captain Jackson).
41. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 124; NOONAN, supra note 21, at 43 (stating
that Spanish representatives filed a libel claiming at least 150 of the Antelope
Africans and Portuguese libelants claimed at least 130 of the Antelope Africans
as property).
42. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 114, 124; United States v. Mulvey; Vol.
B23/36B026, MC 1790-1860, F-7, Folderi; RG 21; Atlanta (noting the claim by
the United States to the Africans aboard the Antelope). Captain Jackson sued
on behalf of the officers and crew of the Dallas as well as on behalf of the United
States claiming the Antelope and its cargo as forfeited pursuant to the Act in
Addition. See Case of the Antelope; Vol. 103, p. 192; MB 1816-1823; RG 21;
Atlanta; infra note 43.
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United States argued that because the Antelope and the Af-
ricans on board were introduced into United States terri-
tory in violation of the Act in Addition, 43 the ship and its
property were subject to the Act's forfeiture provisions. 44
The "Act in Addition" refers to federal legislation out-
lawing international slave trading under United States law.
By an act dated March 2, 1807, Congress prohibited the im-
portation of slaves into the United States after January 1,
1808. 45 The Act in Addition of 1818 amended the act of
March 2, 1807, and subjected ships employed in violation of
the acts to forfeiture.46 The Act in Addition of 1819
amended the Act in Addition of 1818 and granted the
President authority to provide for the disposal of Africans
43. The term "Act in Addition" refers to, collectively, The Act in Addition, ch.
101, 3 stat. 532 (1819), amending Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, 3 stat. 450,
amending Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 stat. 426.
44. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 131-32; Act in Addition, 3 Stat. 532; Monition,
John Jackson Esq. in behalf v. The brig Antelope or General Ramirez, July 15,
1820; Vol. B23/36B026, Mixed Cases 1790-1860, F-7, Folder U.S. or Span.
Consul. v. Brig. Antelope or General Ramirez v. Africans 1820, F-7, Folder 1;
Div. Savannah, Georgia; Off. Circuit Courts; Record Group 21, United States
District Court; National Archives and Records Administration-Southeast
Region (Atlanta) (NARA).
45. Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of American in Congress assembled, That from and after the first
day of January, one thousand eight hundred and eight, it shall not be
lawful to import or bring into the United States or the territories
thereof from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, any negro,
mulatto, or person of colour, with intent to hold, sell, or dispose of such
negro, mulatto, or person of colour, as a slave, or to be held to service or
labour.
See The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 90; NOONAN, supra note 21, at 17; Rudko, supra
note 12, at 77.
46. Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, 3 Stat. 450:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America, in Congress assembled, That from and after the
passing of this act, it shall not be lawful to import or bring, in any
manner whatsoever, into the United States, or territories thereof, from
any foreign kingdom, place, or country, any negro, mulatto, or person of
colour, with intent to hold, sell, or dispose of, any such negro, mulatto,
or person of colour, as a slave, or to be held to service or labour; and
any ship, vessel, or other water craft, employed in any importation as
aforesaid, shall be liable to seizure, prosecution, and forfeiture, in any
district in which it may be found;, one half thereof to the use of the
United States, and the other half to the use of him or them who shall
prosecute the same to effect.
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found in the United States in violation of the laws of the
United States. 47 Congress also authorized a sum, not ex-
47. Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 101, 3 Stat. 532 (1819):
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America, in Congress assembled, That the President of the
United States be, and he is hereby, authorized, whenever he shall
deem it expedient, to cause any of the armed vessels of the United
States, to be employed to cruise on any of the coasts of the United
States, or territories thereof, or of the coast of Africa, or elsewhere,
where he may judge attempts may be made to carry on the slave trade
by citizens or residents of the United States, in contravention of the
acts of Congress prohibiting the same, and to instruct and direct the
commanders of all armed vessels of the United States, to seize, take,
and bring into any port of the United States, all ships or vessels of the
United States, wheresoever found, which may have taken on board, or
which may be intended for the purpose of taking on board, or of
transporting, or may have transported, any negro, mulatto, or person of
colour, in violation of any of the provisions of the act, entitled "An act
in addition to an act to prohibit the importation of slaves into any port
or place within the jurisdiction of the United States, from and after the
first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and eight, and to repeal certain parts of the same," or of any
other act or acts prohibiting the traffic in slaves, to be proceeded
against according to law .... Provided, That the officers and men,...
shall safe keep every negro, mulatto, or person of colour, found on
board of any ship or vessel so seized, taken, or brought into port, for
condemnation, and shall deliver every such negro, mulatto or person of
colour, to the marshal of the district into which they are brought, if into
a port of the United States, or, if elsewhere, to such person or persons
as shall be lawfully appointed by the President of the United States, in
the manner hereinafter directed, transmitting to the President of the
United States, as soon as may be after such delivery, a descriptive list
of such negroes, mulattoes, or persons of colour, that he may give
directions for the disposal of them ....
Citizens violating the Act were subject to being fined and imprisoned. See, e.g.,
Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, §§ 2, 7, 3 Stat. 450. Congress did not set forth in the
act of March 2, 1807, what should be done with enslaved individuals
transported into the United States or its territories when their enslavers were
captured. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 17; Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 426.
Not until the Act in Addition of 1819 did Congress explicitly "contemplate[ I
that any [Africans] found to be the property of the United States in a slave
trade case would be transported back to Africa." G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURE CHANGE 1815-1835, at 695 (1991). Concerned
about the plight of Africans illegally imported into the United States, the
American Society for Colonizing the Free People of Color of the United States
("The American Colonization Society"), approached Henry Clay, Speaker of the
United States House of Representatives, and himself a member of The
American Colonization Society, and proposed that rescued Africans be returned
to Africa. Id. Speaker Clay assigned the matter to a Special Committee which
recommended that the United States form a colony or outpost in Africa for the
purpose of receiving Africans illegally transported into the United States.
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ceeding $100,000, to carry out this task.48 Thus, the pros-
pects for the Africans of the Antelope were either coloniza-
tion in Africa 49 if the United States prevailed or continued
enslavement if the Spanish or Portuguese claimants suc-
ceeded. 50
The Antelope trial commenced before Judge William
Davies, United States District Judge for the District of
Georgia, in the early months of 1821. 51 Judge Davies disposed
of the United States' main argument against the Portuguese
NOONAN, supra note 21, at 18. President James Monroe, a protdg6 of Thomas
Jefferson and of his formula of "emancipation and deportation" of Africans as a
solution to the nation's race problem, committed himself to putting into effect
The American Colonization Society's interpretation of the Act in Addition of
1819. Id. at 23. In a "Special Presidential Message to Congress" delivered on
December 19, 1819, President Monroe "fastened on the capital consideration-
the aim of the Act was to remove Africans from America; as long as they were
kept in America, the Act's purpose was unachieved." Id. at 26; see also The
Antelope, 23 U.S. at 91; NOONAN, supra note 21, at 18; Act of Apr. 20, 1818 ch.
91, §§ 2, 7, 3 Stat. 450.
48. Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 101, § 7, 3 Stat. 534.
The President was authorized by this act:
to make such regulations and arrangements as he may deem expedient
for the safe keeping, support, and removal beyond the limits of the
United States, of all such negroes, mulattoes, or persons of colour, as
may be so delivered and brought within their jurisdiction: And to
appoint a proper person or persons, residing upon the coast of Africa,
as agent or agents for receiving the negroes, mulattoes, or persons of
colour, delivered from on board vessels, seized in the prosecution of the
slave trade by commanders of the United States' armed vessels.
Id. at § 2, 3 Stat. 533.
49. There is no evidence of a policy of reuniting Africans with their families
or of returning them to their country of origin. Moreover, the United States was
aware of an incident in November of 1822 in which nearly 130 newly
emancipated slaves who had been colonized at Cape Mesurado, West Africa,
were attacked by hostile tribes resulting in the deaths of several of the African
colonists. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 84. See, e.g., George Anastaplo, John
Quincy Adams Revisited, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 119, 136 (2000); The
Antelope, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 546, 550-51 (1827) (referencing the "Act in
addition to the acts prohibiting the slave trade"). The United States' policy
consisted of repatriating slaves to the African continent and settling them in
Liberia as free persons. SHAW, supra note 21, at 224-25 n.19.
50. Anastaplo, supra note 49, at 136; NOONAN, supra note 21, at 116-17;
Case of the Antelope; Vol. 103, pp. 195-96; MB 1816-1823; RG 21; Atlanta.
51. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 57 (stating that Judge Davies issued his
opinion on February 21, 1821). Prior to this time, in December 1820, Judge
Davies heard the piracy case against John Smith. Smith was acquitted on all
counts by a jury. Id. at 53.
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and Spanish claimants by finding that, although the United
States had outlawed the international slave trade, neither
Spain nor Portugal had completely outlawed it.52
The principle common to these cases is that the legality
of the capture of a vessel engaged in the slave trade, de-
pends on the law of the country to which the vessel belongs.
If that law gives its sanction to the trade, restitution will be
decreed; if that law prohibits it, the vessel and cargo will be
condemned as good prize.
No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged,
than the perfect equality of nations . . . . It results from this
equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each
legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone. A
right, then, which is vested in all by the consent of all, can be de-
vested [sic] only [by] consent; and this trade, in which all have par-
ticipated, must remain lawful to those who cannot be induced to
relinquish it. As no nation can prescribe a rule for others, none can
make a law of nations; and this traffic remains lawful to those
whose governments have not forbidden it. 53
Judge Davies wrote that despite its injustice, unless a
government had banned the slave trade, it created property
rights.5 4 The United States recognized Spain and Portugal's
property rights as the United States had an unequivocally
slave-tolerant Constitution and conceptualized the African
as constitutional property.55
52. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 58. United States District Attorney Richard
Wylly Habersham, a Savannah native and a member of The American
Colonization Society, handled the case for the United States. Id. at 44, 53-59.
Rudko, supra note 11, at 82 (stating that Chief Justice John Marshall
acknowledged that, although evolving, slave trading had not been universally
recognized as an illegal practice and therefore other nations might have a
property claim in Africans). South of the equator, Spanish and Portuguese
shippers continued, legally, to engage in the international slave trade. SHAW,
supra note 21, at 218.
53. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 118, 122 (1825).
54. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 58; see also The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 118.
55. See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN
THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 82 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the implementation of the
slave tolerant Constitution and the legal recognition of the slave as a "species of
property"); BRIGHAM, supra note 1, at 39-40:
The property protected by the Constitution, like property generally, is "a
system of authority established by government," and, as with any right,
it "depends on the promise of government".... When the courts rule on
property, the decision involves a dominion one may lawfully exercise and
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Once the district court decided not to dismiss Spain and
Portugal's claims, the critical issue for the claimants was the
allocation and distribution of the property, including the
Africans. 56 Judge Davies ordered that the Vice Consul of
Portugal take the Africans originating from the Portuguese
ships and that the Vice Consul of Spain take the Antelope and
those Africans who had first been on board the Antelope.57 The
Africans taken from the Exchange were allocated to the
United States. 58 Judge Davies then decreed the total number
of Africans to be allocated to Spain, Portugal, and the United
States.59 Importantly, he did not specify which particular
Africans were allocated to each country.60
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the appeal of
The Antelope on May 8, 1821.61 On May 11, 1821, Justice
William Johnson affirmed that part of the district court's
decision which allocated the Antelope to Portugal and re-
versed the portion of the district court's decision allocating
Africans originating from Portuguese ships to Portugal,
Africans originating from the Antelope to Spain, and Afri-
its application in a particular situation. In constitutional history, the
"things" to which the right is applied have changed, as have the doctrinal
standards. The nature of the dominion, however, has not changed much
at all. The society that allowed slaveholding made choices that seem
wrong to us, but the way they were enforced should be comprehensible.
The continuity in the meaning of the concept, despite shifts in the subject
of its protection, is a key to constitutional property.
56. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 125-27.
57. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 59.
58. Id. at 60. Judge Davies also ordered that Captain Jackson should be paid
salvage on all the property in addition to a bounty in the amount of twenty-five
dollars on each of the Africans determined to have originated from the
Exchange. Id. The Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's determination
regarding Captain Jackson's entitlement to the bounty and salvage. Extract
from Decree of Circuit Court, Case of the Antelope otherwise the Ramirez and
Cargo, May 11, 1821; Vol. B23/36B026, Mixed Cases 1790-1860, F-7, John
Jackson Com. Rev. Cutter Dallas v. The Antelope or General Ramirez
Admiralty, 1821, Box 27, F-8; Div. Savannah, Georgia; Off. Circuit Courts;
Record Group 21, United States District Court; National Archives and Records
Administration-Southeast Region (Atlanta).
59. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 59-60. After deducting from the total number of
Africans initially brought into custody, the total number missing or deceased, Judge
Davies apportioned this loss among Spain, Portugal, and the United States. Id.
60. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 65.
61. Id. at 61.
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cans originating from the Exchange to the United States.62
The most critical part of the court's opinion pertains to the
chosen method for identifying the Africans and distributing
them.63 The relevant portion of the circuit court opinion
states:
Until some better reason can be assigned I must maintain that it
is a question altogether "inter alios" whether the Spanish &
Portuguese nations had authorised the traffic in which their
vessels were engaged. Not so as to the American vessel. I have a
law to direct me as to that, and the slaves taken out of her must be
liberated. I would that it were in my power to do perfect justice on
their behalf. But this is now impossible. I can decree freedom to a
certain number .... It is impossible to identify the individuals
who were taken from the American vessel, and yet it is not less
certain that the benefit of this decree is their right and theirs
alone. Poor would be the consolation to them to know that because
we could not identify them we have given away their freedom to
others. Yet shall we refuse to act because we are not vested with
the power of divination?
62. Case of the Antelope; Vol. 103, p. 197; MB 1816-1823; RG 21; Atlanta.
63. The allocation to the United States is most important because these
individuals would ultimately be freed. Case of the Antelope; Vol. 103, p. 195-96;
MB 1816-1823; RG 21; Atlanta; see also SHAw, supra note 21, at 218:
In the federal circuit court for Georgia, the claims of the . . . Antelope,
to be a legitimate privateer were quickly dismissed and all of the
activities of her surviving crew deemed to have been strictly piratical.
But this determination meant that the vessel herself and the slaves
aboard remained the legal property of the original Spanish and
Portuguese owners, and that only the 25 slaves taken from the Rhode
Island vessel [the Exchange] could be confiscated and, under the new
law, given their freedom. This decision gave rise to difficult practical
problems in its implementation, as all of the slaves in the American,
Spanish and Portuguese vessels had been mingled together by their
captors and could no longer be identified individually; moreover, about
one third of the original total had died. The solution devised by the
circuit court was that sixteen of the surviving slaves, representing the
fair proportion of the original twenty-five, should be chosen by lot and
given their freedom, while the balance should be returned to their
Spanish and Portuguese claimants.
Moreover, the Act of 1820, (the full title of which is "An Act to continue in
force 'An act to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish the crime
of piracy,' and also to make further provisions for punishing the crime of
piracy"), formally declared that participation in the international slave trade
constituted an act of piracy. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, § 4, 3 stat. 600-01
(1820); SHAw, supra note 21, at 214-15.
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We can only do the best in our power, the lot must decide their
fate, and the Almighty will direct the hand that acts in the
selection ....
... That as to the slaves the number taken from the American
vessel the Exchange be ascertained by a ratio stated from the
whole number on board the Antelope when she left the coast, the
number actually surviving when the separation takes place & the
number found on board the Exchange and that the number so
found being separated by lot from among the men and boys, 64 the
individuals thus selected be delivered to the United States. That
the residue be retained in the hands of the marshal until the next
term at which they shall be divided by lot between the Spanish &
Portuguese claimants according as they shall make their several
interests appear on further proof.65
On January 1, 1822, the United States appealed to the
United States Supreme Court that portion of the Sixth
Circuit Court opinion allocating Africans from the Antelope
to Spain and Portugal. 66 Chief Justice John Marshall,
writing for the Court, decided the extent of Spain and
Portugal's entitlement to the Antelope Africans and directly
addressed the casting of lots. 67
64. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 66. "For the first time in the judicial record
of the case it was necessary to name some of the Africans as human beings.
They were all males, since, as only men and boys had come from the Exchange,
Justice Johnson directed that only males could be winners." Id.
65. Case of the Antelope; Vol. 103, p. 192-98; MB 1816-1823; RG 21;
Atlanta; Opinion of U.S. Supreme Court, Vol. 104, MB 1823-1824, pp. 133-36;
RG 21; Atlanta (citing to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
referencing the lot language and reversing the lower court opinion as to the part
directing the amount of restitution due the Spanish and Portuguese claimants).
66. Charles Mulvey, Vice Consul. v. 150 African negroes part of the cargo
of the General Ramirez, January 2, 1822; Vol. 103, Minute Book 1816-1823, pp.
263-64; Div. Savannah, Georgia; Off. Circuit Courts; Record Group 21, United
States District Court; National Archives and Records Administration-
Southeast Region (Atlanta).
67. Although it shied away from a general condemnation of the slave trade
on the basis of international law, the Supreme Court could still aid the cause of
the Antelope Africans by its interpretation of "strict law." For example, the
Court took the view that it could inquire into the claimants' title and that
something more than mere possession was needed to prove title under the
peculiar circumstances of this case. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 131-
32 (1825); 10 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL: CORRESPONDENCE, PAPERS, AND
SELECTED JUDICIAL OPINIONS JANUARY 1824-MARCH 1827, at 157 (Charles F.
Hobson ed., 2000); Rudko, supra note 11, at 82-83.
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The Court dismissed Portugal's claim. 68 According to
the Court, the absence of any individual Portuguese claim-
ants suggested that the true owners were not Portuguese
citizens and that the true owners wanted to conceal their
nationality because their country of origin had outlawed the
international slave trade.69
The Court then disposed of the contest between Spain
and the United States. The Court required Spain to desig-
nate by proof the Africans who had first been on board the
Antelope and later removed from her possession. 70 Accord-
ing to the Court, "[tihe onus probandi, as to the number of
Africans which were on board when the vessel was cap-
tured, unquestionably lies on the Spanish libellants. 71 Their
proof is not satisfactory beyond ninety-three. The individu-
als who compose this number must be designated to the
satisfaction of the Circuit Court."72
68. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 130; see also SHAW, supra note 21, at 219 ("No
subject of the crown of Portugal has appeared to assert his title to this property,
no individual has been designated as its proper owner.' Thus, (Chief Justice]
Marshall reasoned, the ownership of the Portuguese slaves, or even their status
as slaves, was in considerable doubt."); 10 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL,
supra note 67, at 157.
69. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 129-31.
70. Id. at 128.
71. "A libel is the admiralty law equivalent of a lawsuit, and the libellant (or
libelant) is the equivalent of the plaintiff in an action at law." JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 29 (5th ed. 2002).
72. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 128-29. On December 21, 1825, Justice
William Johnson and District Judge Jeremiah Touche Cuyler, sitting as a court
of two, certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the lottery had
been approved by the Court. Petition of Spanish Vice Consul for a division, In
the matter of "The Africans" of the "General Ramirez" or Antelope, December
21, 1825; Vol. B23/36B026, Mixed Cases 1790-1860, F-7, U.S. or Spanish Consul
v. Brig. Antelope or General Ramirez v. Africans 1820, F-7, Folder 2; Div.
Savannah, Georgia; Off. Circuit Courts; Record Group 21, United States
District Court; National Archives and Records Administration-Southeast
Region (Atlanta); NOONAN, supra note 21, at 119. They disagreed as to the
proper interpretation of Justice Marshall's opinion pertaining to the casting of
lots. Id. Of course, Justice Johnson had earlier approved of the lot in his 1821
opinion. Case of the Antelope; Vol. 103, pp. 192-198; MB 1816-1823; RG 21;
Atlanta. Judge Cuyler was not so certain that the Court had approved of this
method of allocation. NOONAN, supra note 21, at 119. In an explanatory decree
at the February term, 1826, the Court ordered that Spain must designate by
proof, to the satisfaction of the Circuit Court, the Africans to be delivered to
Spain. Libel Decree, United States v. Africans of the Cargo of the Antelope or
General Ramirez, May 9, 1826; Vol. 104, Minute Book 1823-1834, U.S. Circuit
Court, Southern District, Georgia, Savannah, p. 181; Div. Savannah, Georgia;
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The number of Africans apportioned to Spain was ulti-
mately reduced from ninety-three to fifty because the Court
apportioned to Spain part of the loss resulting from Africans
who died during the ensuing litigation and "it was the opinion
of [the] Court, that [the] number [ninety-three] should be re-
duced according to the whole number living. The circuit court
fixed the whole number to which the Spanish claimants were
entitled at fifty, and then inquired as to their identity. ' 73 The
circuit court determined that Spain ultimately produced
credible evidence to the extent of thirty-nine 74 of the Africans
and the United States Supreme Court agreed. 75
Off. Circuit Courts; Record Group 21, United States District Court; National
Archives and Records Administration-Southeast Region (Atlanta) (NARA).
[I]t is ordered that the Spanish Claimant in the above case do on or
before the next Term of this Court, designate by proof to the
satisfaction of the Court, the Africans of the above Cargo, not exceeding
fifty in number which by the decree of the Supreme Court of the United
States made at February Term 1825 and the explanatory decree of the
said Court made at February Term 1826 the said claimant claims to be
entitled to.
Id.; see also The Antelope, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 413, 413 (1826).
73. The Antelope, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 546, 552-53 (1827).
74. See SHAW, supra note 21, at 224 n.19.
These 39, the remnant of about 150 original Spanish slaves, were not,
however, conveyed into... slavery. During the extended pendancy of the
Antelope case, they had been nominally in the custody of a federal
marshall, but were actually placed at work upon plantations, and during
that time "many of them had been married, and became heads of
families-had been partially domesticated with us, and were desirous of
remaining in this country" . . . .A spirited debate ensued. The three
alternatives facing the 39 blacks were to remain in Georgia as slaves, to
be transported to [their Spanish owners in] Cuba as slaves, or to be sent
to Liberia as free persons. They obviously preferred the first choice.
Id. Grondona, who had formerly been a second officer on board of the Antelope,
identified the Spanish Africans by various methods including the making of
signs, speaking with the Africans, and having the Africans speak to him. 25
U.S. at 553. The Court also considered that the designated Africans appeared to
recognize Grondona and were able to communicate with him although the
witnesses present were not able to understand the languages spoken by the
Africans nor by Grondona. Id.
75. The Antelope, 25 U.S. at 552; 10 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra
note 67, at 157:
Like a bouncing ball, the case reappeared on the Supreme Court's 1826
docket on the certificate of division. Without argument, the Court
issued a tersely worded order that the Africans to be delivered to the
Spanish claimant "must be designated by proof made to the
satisfaction" of the circuit court. At length that court identified thirty-
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The consequence of the Spanish claimants' failure to
carry their burden of proof meant that their right to posses-
sion of particular Africans as property was diminished.7 6 To
the extent the Spanish claimants failed to meet their bur-
den, their claim to possession of the Africans as property
was denied and such Africans were delivered over to the
only other party with a viable claim-the United States. 77
"The process of returning the Africans dragged on from the
date of the decision on March 15, 1825, until July of 1827
'when some 130 Africans adjudicated to the United States
sailed from Savannah for Liberia.' "78
nine individuals to be turned over to the Spanish claimant, including at
least one who had been certified free by the lottery employed in the
original circuit court decree.
Id. (citing The Antelope, 24 U.S. 413).
76. The United States Supreme Court explicitly mentions that the
international slave trade was banned in the United States. See, e.g., 23 U.S. at
115-16. It is therefore thinking in terms of having banned the slave trade when
it requires the designation by proof by Spain and the Court has to know that
the proof will be difficult if not impossible to produce. See, e.g., 25 U.S. 552
(stating that competent evidence exists to designate by proof). The Court has
placed a very high burden of proof on Spain, and the result of any failure to
prove identities of claimed slaves will be the liberation of the slaves. See id. at
551. "We are of opinion it ought to be certified to the Circuit Court, that all the
Africans captured in the Antelope, except those directed to be delivered to the
Spanish claimants, should be decreed to be delivered to the United States,
absolutely and unconditionally, without the precedent payment of expenses." 25
U.S. at 551. United States v. Certain Africans the Cargo of the Ramirez,
December 1, 1826; Vol. 104, Minute Book 1823-1834, U.S. Circuit Court,
Southern District, Georgia, Savannah, p. 207; Div. Savannah, Georgia; Off.
Circuit Courts; Record Group 21, United States District Court; National
Archives and Records Administration-Southeast Region (Atlanta) (NARA):
And upon collating and combining their decree of 1825 with the
explanatory decree of 1826 [referring to decrees of the United States
Supreme Court] the two will be found to amount to this, that the rights
of the Spaniard shall be recognized, but in reducing that right to
possession they shall be held to have established a claim originally to
ninety three, which number shall be reduced by the average of deaths,
and to the number so ascertained they shall be held to produce proof of
individual identity. But all the cargo with the exception of those to be
thus identified shall be delivered over to the United States. This will be
doing what that Court certainly intended to do-it will make a final
disposition of a most troublesome charge.
See also id. at 205 (referring to the Decree of 1825 and the explanatory Decree
of 1826 as emanating from the United States Supreme Court).
77. Rudko, supra note 11, at 82-83 (citing 23 U.S. at 133).
78. Id. at 83. (quoting 10 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL, supra note 67, at 158).
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF CASTING LOTS AND THE ANTELOPE CASE
The lottery has a long history.79 For instance, there are
numerous Biblical accounts of casting lots.8 0 Casting lots,
79. See supra Parts I and II..See, e.g., JOHN BURNHEIM, IS DEMOCRACY
POSSIBLE?: THE ALTERNATIVE TO ELECTORAL POLITICS 9 (1985) ("In order to have
democracy we must abandon elections, and in most cases referendums, and
revert to the ancient principle of choosing by lot those who are to hold various
public offices."); THOMAS W. SIMON, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE: LAW,
POLITICS, AND PHILOSOPHY 205 (1995) ("Organizations operating according to lot
selection rather than majority rule can qualify as democratic."); JON ELSTER,
SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 62-69
(1989) (discussing societal lotteries in various contexts).
Shirley Jackson's fictional account of the use of an annual lottery to elect the
victim for their ritual stoning shocks readers in part because of the casual
manner in which the lottery is used to make critical decisions. Shirley Jackson,
The Lottery, in THE LOTTERY AND OTHER SHORT STORIES 291 (ed. 1982).
See also 1 POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS 490 (F. Hultsch trans.,
Evelyn S. Schuckburgh trans., 1962) (discussing the Roman practice of
dispensing military punishment upon the commission of certain crimes by
casting lot). According to Roman practice, if a number of men in a legion are
found guilty of mutiny such that it is determined to be impossible to subject all
of them to execution, "[tihe Tribune assembles the legion, calls the defaulters to
the front, and, after administering a sharp rebuke, selects five or eight or
twenty out of them by lot, so that those selected should be about a tenth of those
who have been guilty of the act of cowardice." Id. Those selected by lot would
then be punished "without mercy" and the remainder would be punished less
severely. Exposing all to an equal chance of having the lot fall on them and
making conspicuous examples of those escaping the lot was determined to be
the best means of "inspir[ing] fear for the future, and . . . correct[ing] the
mischief which [had] actually occurred." Id. at 490-91; see also STEPHEN DANDO-
COLLINS, CAESAR'S LEGION: THE EPIC SAGA OF JULIUS CAESAR'S ELITE TENTH
LEGION AND THE ARMIES OF ROME 88 (2002) (describing Caesar's official
decimation of the 9th Legion by drawing lots for every tenth man to die after
finding that the 9th Legion was guilty of instigating a mutiny).
80. See Leviticus 16:6-10 (New International). Moses, believed by
Christians and Jews to be the author of the Book of Leviticus, describes the
ritual for the Day of Atonement:
(6) Aaron is to offer the bull for his own sin offering to make atonement
for himself and his household.
(7) Then he is to take the two goats and present them before the LORD
at the entrance to the Tent of Meeting.
(8) He is to cast lots for the two goats-one lot for the LORD and the
other for the scapegoat.
(9) Aaron shall bring the goat whose lot falls to the LORD and sacrifice
it for a sin offering.
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though, is not confined to the distant past; it is presently
used in a variety of situations.8 ' One of the primary benefits
of casting lots is that it absolves decision-makers from
making difficult choices with harsh consequences for the
loser.8 2 Casting lots often masks the pre-lottery decisions
(10) But the goat chosen by lot as the scapegoat shall be presented
alive before the LORD to be used for making atonement by sending it
into the desert as a scapegoat.
Id.; Joshua 18:1-10 (New International), (discussing the distribution of the
inheritance of seven of the twelve tribes of Israel by the method of casting lots);
1 Chronicles 26:13-16 (New International) (casting lots to determine the
division and assignment of the gatekeepers who were responsible for
ministering in the Lord's temple); Nehemiah 11:1 (New International)
(discussing casting lots to redistribute populations from their then present town
to Jerusalem to live); Jonah 1:3-7 (New International) Jonah fled from the Lord
and attempted to reach Tarshish by ship; during the voyage a great storm arose
and threatened to destroy the ship. The sailors on board cast lots to determine
who was responsible for the storm "and the lot fell on Jonah." Id; see also John
19:24 (discussing the casting of lots after the crucifixion of Jesus to distribute
his clothes); Acts 1:21-26 (New International). The then-eleven apostles cast lots
to determine which of two men, Joseph or Matthias, would assume the
ministerial role vacated by Judas. Id.
Biblical accounts reveal an "interpretation of selection by lot, as the
revelation of God's will" not as a random selection device. ELSTER, supra note
78, at 50; see also TORSTEIN ECKHOFF, SOCIAL INTERACTION: ITS DETERMINANTS IN
SOCIAL INTERACTION 215 (1974); NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE: ON LOTTERIES
AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING 16, 18 (1999).
The Bible never criticizes casting lots as a distributive device. ELSTER,
supra note 79, at 50. "From the Old Testament until the early modern age,
divinatory, divisory and consultory lotteries were often used for the purpose of
discovering God's will." Id. Today, the lottery is viewed as a method for equally
distributing the chances for participating individuals to obtain the relevant
burden or benefit. ECKHOFF, supra, at 215. These two competing views of the
lottery, meaning the lottery as expressing God's divine will verses the lottery as
expressing chance, are inherently incompatible; God's decisions are not
perceived as random. Id. at 216; Proverbs 16:33 (New International). Proverbs
16:33 states that the lot was commonly used to make decisions; however, every
decision came from God. Thus, God controlled, not chance. Id. This interstice in
logic has not prevented the two views from co-existing. ECKHOFF, supra, at 216.
In modern times, the general perception of the lot as a method of discerning
God's intentions has been replaced by a more analytically critical interpretation
of casting lots and of randomization as merely one of several decision-making
devices. ELSTER, supra note 79, at 40. "Randomness can be seen as a property of
a process or as a property of the selections it generates." Id. Thus, the concept of
randomization might be confusing or incoherent to some. Id.
81. See supra Part I and accompanying notes and text.
82. Barbara Goodwin summarizes the benefits of the lottery as follows:
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that necessitate tough choices, the types of choices that lot-
tery advocates allege make casting lots an attractive alter-
native to responsible decision-making. 83
The lottery's veiling of the decision to avoid making dif-
ficult choices is best illustrated by considering instances of
tough decisions, or what Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt
call "tragic choices"--choices that challenge a government's
fundamentally held notions and values. 84 The Antelope is
1. The lottery puts choice in distribution beyond human interference
and so prevents corruption, if it is fairly operated.
2. Use of a lottery therefore means that no one is to blame for the
selection; this is especially important if evils are being distributed, or
harsh decisions taken.
3. Likewise, the lottery allows no one to boast of his or her selection or
to claim that it is especially apposite or deserved ....
4. Being, as it is, a 'refusal to choose', the lottery lets everyone off the
hook where unpleasant or mortal decisions have to be taken. Not only
is no one to blame, but no one actually has to do the choosing.
5. The lottery assumes that everyone in the draw is equally qualified,
or deserving, or liable. This is a precondition of any lottery, but it is
also part of the justification for its use.
6. If properly conducted, a lottery is entirely impartial between
individuals and is thus eminently fair according to the basic and widely
accepted definition of fairness.
7. Repeated drawings of the lot tend to equalize everyone's chances of
enjoying whatever goods, or suffering whatever evils, are being
distributed.
GOODWIN, supra note 2, at 45-46.
83. See infra Part III.A.
84. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 145. Calabresi and Bobbitt
define "tragic choices" as those culturally determined by a society, not as those
decisions that each individual may perceive as "appalling." Id. at 17. •
Tragic choices come about in this way. Though scarcity can often be
avoided for some goods by making them available without cost to
everyone, it cannot be evaded for all goods. In the distribution of scarce
goods society has to decide which methods of allotment to use, and of
course each of these methods-markets, political allocations, lotteries,
and so forth-may be modified, or combined with another. The
distribution of some goods entails great suffering or death. When
attention is riveted on such distributions they arouse emotions of
compassion, outrage, and terror. It is then that conflicts are laid bare
between on the one hand, those values by which society determined the
beneficiaries of the distributions, and (with nature) the perimeters of
scarcity, and on the other hand, those humanistic moral values which
prize life and well-being.
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one such example of a tragic choice.8 5 These choices vary
among societies depending on the norms, rules, and stan-
dards of each society.8 6
The essence of a tragic choice is that sufficient of the essential
good cannot be produced-in the short term, at least-to satisfy
everyone, and that the consequence of this shortage is life-
threatening for some people. Alternatively, a tragic choice must be
made when an unmitigated evil has to be allocated to someone out
of a group.8 7
In such conflicts, at such junctures, societies confront the tragic
choice.
Id. at 18 (footnote omitted). Tragic choices are notable, in part, for their "moral
remainders" or "moral traces" which are described as the persistent feeling that
some injustice or wrong has occurred even though the action taken was, under
the circumstances, the most appropriate course. See W. Bradley Wendel,
Professional Roles and Moral Agency, 89 GEO. L.J. 667, 710 (2001) (book
review). Particularly in the context of tough decisions or tragic choices, the
lottery exonerates decision-makers by freeing individuals and government from
the burden of making difficult decisions, thereby placing blame and
responsibility at the feet of chance. See Goodwin, supra note 2, at 174-75:
The reasons for using a lottery to make tragic choices are:
1. that the limits of 'mindful' (i.e. psychological, rational or moral)
choice have been reached;
2. the blindness or impartiality of the lottery process; and
3. the moral judgement that people should be treated as absolutely
equal where basic life-chances (chances of life or survival) are involved.
Id. at 175. But cf. CALABRESI & BOBBIT, supra note 3, at 41-44 (criticizing
lotteries and randomness as allocative approaches). Not all lotteries involve
tragic choices. See, e.g., ELSTER, SOLOMONIC, supra note 79, at 59, 93 (discussing
lotteries in strategic decision-making and lotteries in the judicial process
pertaining to assignment of judges and magistrates to cases). As a component of
strategic decision-making, for example, "the purpose of randomization is not to
resolve indeterminacy, but to keep other people uncertain about what one is
doing." Id. at 59. Thus, allowing decisions to be made by casting lots might be a
procedure that avoids revealing regularities in behavior, discernable by one's
opponent or targeted object. See id. Elster uses the innocuous examples of poker
opponents and Native American hunters attempting to prevent their opponents
or prey from discerning a pattern as two examples of the use of casting lots in
strategic decision-making situations. Id.
85. Supra Part II.
86. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 49.
87. GOODWIN, supra note 2, at 174; see also CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note
3, at 18, 22.
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A. Understanding First- and Second-Order Decisions
Before considering the appropriate role of casting lots in
decision-making, one must discuss the choices that typically
pre-date the lottery and weight it, thus preventing the
lottery from being a "pure" lottery.8s "Pure" lottery is used
in this article in contrast to a weighted lottery, meaning a
lottery that is modified through the use of either pre- or
post-selection lottery criteria to account for individual char-
acteristics and societal goals.8 9 Accounting for such charac-
teristics and goals affects who is subject to the lottery and
the lottery results. 90 These pre-lottery decisions sometimes
necessitate the tragic choice. 91
Casting lots involves at least two levels of decisions. 92
First, government must decide how much of the resource will
be produced (a first-order decision). 93 These are the choices
88. See CALABRESI & BOBBITF, supra note 3, at 41-44. Pure lotteries are
extremely rare because virtually all lotteries are preceded by choices, no matter
how remote, that affect the lottery and its outcome. Thus, most discussions of
the lottery should rationally anticipate the weighted lottery context. Pure
lotteries discourage individuals from distinguishing themselves by investing the
time and energy necessary to qualify to assume positions requiring more than a
remedial skill level. See ELSTER, SOLOMONIC, supra note 79, at 111. According to
Calabresi and Bobbitt:
By treating as equal all candidates, lotteries embody the naive or
simple conception of equality, which is anathema to other conceptions.
Moreover, in their pure form, lotteries give no weight to either
individual or societal desires-except the societal desire to treat
everyone in precisely the same way, regardless of the consequences.
Nor do lotteries entirely avoid the costs of costing. True, they do not
price tragic goods nor do they nakedly involve the state in the selection
of victim-losers. But they do something just as costly. The pure lottery
inevitably spotlights the first-order determination which created the
scarcity. This has the same effect as pricing lives, for example, since it
emphasizes our inability to maintain that the right to the scarce
resource . . . is absolute.
CALABRESI & BOBBIrr, supra note 3, at 145-46.
89. CALABRESI & BOBBIrTT, supra note 3, at 41-44.
90. See id. at 42-43.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 92-95.
92. See CALABRESI & BOBBIT, supra note 3, at 19. Some scholars also refer to
a third-order decision, the individual's decision to apply for a scarce resource,
possibly including an exemption from a burdensome responsibility. See ELSTER,
SOLOMOIC, supra note 79, at 68-69. Consideration of third-order decisions is
beyond the scope of this article.
93. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 18-19.
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that generally create the need that the lottery is designed to
address. 94 Second, government must decide who shall receive
what is produced (a second-order decision). 95 Consideration
of casting lots and of its relationship to first- and second-or-
der decisions reveals the lottery's masking effect.
As previously stated, my critique has two aspects: first,
casting lots is deceptive because it is preceded by non-
random decisions with significant distributional effects;
second, casting lots is unfair because it does not account for
individual merit and characteristics. 96 At the level of the
first-order decision, a determination to provide more re-
sources in one area means that fewer resources will be
available to commit to competing endeavors and pursuits.9 7
Tragic choices show two kinds of moving progressions. First, there is
society's oscillation between the two sorts of decisions it must make
about the scarce good. It must decide how much of it will be produced,
within the limits set by natural scarcity, and also who shall get what is
made .... [Tihe former decision is called a first-order determination
and the latter a second-order determination or decision. Secondly,
there is the motion that is composed of the succession of decision,
rationalization, and violence as quiet replaces anxiety and is replaced
by it when society evades, confronts, and remakes the tragic choice.
Id. at 19; see also ELSTER, SOLOMONIC, supra note 78, at 68 & n.114 (referencing
Calabresi and Bobbitt and their first-order, second-order distinction).
94. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 18-19; ELSTER, SOLOMONIC,
supra note 79, at 68 & n.114.
95. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 19; see also ELSTER, SOLOMONIC,
supra note 79, at 68 & n.114 (referencing Calabresi and Bobbitt and the first-
order, second-order distinction).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
97. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 279 (1990). Choices are
made in a world of incommensurability. See ELSTER, SOLOMONIC, supra note 79,
at 108. Incommensurability is one variety of indeterminacy. See id.
Here comparisons of the claims or the options is inherently impossible or
unreliable, not just costly or difficult. In individual choice this situation
can arise when preference orderings are incomplete or when it is
impossible to assign numerical probabilities to the outcomes of action. In
social allocation it can arise in several ways. First, within a given
dimension of choice, interpersonal comparisons may be inherently
controversial. Consider the allocation of medical resources according to
such criteria as social utility, need and past contributions to society.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and
Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994). Professor Sunstein explores the
manner in which choices and valuations are made among incommensurable
goods and acknowledges the substantial task involved in establishing an
adequate theory for determining how society should make choices among
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The first-order decision is a choice about the degree of scar-
city that government will permit.98 The second-order deci-
sion selects who will benefit from receiving or, conversely,
who will bear the burden of doing without desired re-
sources. 99 As Calabresi and Bobbitt indicate, at times first-
and second-order decisions are made together but in in-
stances of tragic choices, they are made independently. 10 0
As long as the two levels of decisions are maintained sepa-
rately, decision-makers can facilitate the perception that
the government is not responsible for creating the scar-
city'01 or the "unmitigated evil" compelling the tragic
choice.' 0 2 Casting lots masks important first- and second-
order decisions; it also perpetuates the often unfounded be-
lief that the lottery allocation is fair, meaning unaffected by
bias or human intervention.103
competing incommensurable goods and among types of valuation that are
different. He asserts that there is no established formula for dictating how
choices among incommensurable goods should be assessed; rather, the criteria
for appropriate public and private action vary and the search for valid criteria
requires careful examination of individualized cases and an appreciation for the
consequences of choices made. Id. at 857-58, 861.
98. See CALABRESI & BOBBI'IT, supra note 3, at 19; ELSTER, SOLOMONIC, supra
note 79, at 68-69.
99. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 19. Second-order decisions are
also used to allocate burdensome tasks and dangerous responsibilities such as
draft participation. ELSTER, SOLOMONIC, supra note 78, at 68.
100. See CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 20.
101. In actuality, general scarcity exists, meaning there are fewer resources
whose abundance knows no bounds, than there are resources that are either
owned, or restricted. See MUNZER, supra note 97, at 279. Exceptions to the rule
of general scarcity exist of course. For example, air is unowned, although if one
wants air for a particular purpose or of a special composition, it must be
compressed and contained so that it can be sold and marketed. Id.; see also
Fleck, supra note 9, at 1608-09.
102. When first- and second-order decisions are made separately, it:
[A]llows for the more complex mixtures of allocation approaches which
are brought to bear on the tragic choice, and it permits a society to
cleave to a different mixture of values at each order. Indeed, when the
first-order determination of a tragic choice appears to be no more than
a dependent function of the second order, it will usually be the case
that the connection is illusory, serving to obscure the fact of tragic
scarcity and-while the illusion lasts-evading the tragic choice.
CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 20.
103. See, e.g., ELSTER, SOLOMONIC, supra note 79, at 110-12, 121 (arguing
that a reduction in the ability to alter the lottery's outcome through exercise of
discretionary power, for example, is a fundamental reason for using lotteries);
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B. Understanding The Antelope as Impacted by First and
Second- Order Decisions
Decisions in The Antelope litigation reveal a number
of first- and second-order decisions by the circuit court. 104
The Antelope is an example of a weighted lottery in which
the circuit court purportedly considered substantive criteria
such as need,105 fitness, 106 desert,1 07 status,10 8 and posi-
tion' 09 in conjunction with casting lots.110 Substantive crite-
ria weight the lottery."' First, substantive criteria are used
to define the pool of participants in the lottery; second and
less frequently, these criteria are used to eliminate some of
the randomly chosen participants and in this way the sub-
stantive criteria serve as a post-selection mechanism. 1 2 De-
spite the weighting effect, randomness does not generally
guarantee that those most in need or best suited to take ad-
Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got To Do With It? Environmental Justice and the
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1030 (1993)
(stating that in an ex ante scheme a lottery procedure can ensure for each
participant an equal chance at being chosen to bear a societal burden);
ECKHOFF, supra note 80, at 304 (stating that some value randomness because it
perpetuates the belief that randomness shields participants from bias);
CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 41-44.
104. See supra Part II; infra Part III.B.
105. According to Torstein Eckhoff, the five most important individual
characteristics relevant to decision-making are individual need, fitness, desert,
status, and position. See ECKHOFF, supra note 80, at 38. Need is used, in this
sense, as descriptive of what an individual wants or desires. Alternatively, it can
be understood in a normative sense as indicative of what an individual honestly
believes is required or believes would be in his or her best interest. See id.
106. Fitness references an individual's ability to safeguard the benefits
bestowed upon him or her, to withstand any burdens imposed, and to learn from
any punishment or reward experiences. See id.
107. The notion of desert includes the concept of retribution and duly earned
rewards and punishment. See id.
108. Status refers to an individual's inclusion in a socially recognized and
relevant category. The categories can either be ordered by rank such as
adult/child or they can be ordered on the same level, such as male/female. See id.
109. Position simply refers to a person's position on a waiting list. See id.
110. See supra Part II; infra Part III.B.
111. ELSTER, SOLOMONIC, supra note 79, at 67.
112. See DUXBURY, supra note 80, at 18. Duxbury states that human
judgment is necessarily a part of every lottery. "[P]eople decide where lotteries
should be used, what forms those lotteries should take and who falls into the
pool of eligible candidates." Id.
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vantage of the object of the random allocation will actually
prevail. 113
First-order decisions weight lotteries by defining the
scope of the lottery. The first-order decision to allow slavery
in the American colonies had resounding legal and moral
implications in The Antelope and led to other important
first-order decisions including, among others, choices: (1) to
conceptualize Africans as personal property subject to being
sold, mortgaged, and/or leased;114 (2) to restrict the liberties
of Africans; (3) to later outlaw the international slave trade
after January 1, 1808, while not outlawing domestic slavery
and slave breeding as it already existed in the United
States; 115 (4) to legally recognize the property rights of
Spain and Portugal which had not outlawed slavery nor the
international slave trade;1" 6 and (5) to return Africans im-
ported into the United States in violation of the Act in
Addition to Africa and colonize them. 117 These choices rep-
113. See ECKHOFF, supra note 80, at 304.
114. GEORGE M. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE
SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 33-34, 39-41 (1968); see
Thomas D. Morris, "Society is not marked by punctuality in the payment of
debts" The Chattel Mortgages of Slaves, in 11 ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY:
LAW, THE CONSTITUTION AND SLAVERY 261, 265 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989).
"[Djuring the establishment of slavery in the 1600s slaves were often defined as
real property, not as chattels personal. This was true in Barbados, South
Carolina, and in Virginia (which did not change the definition of slaves to
chattels personal until the early 1790s)." Id. (citation omitted); see also Arthur
Howington, 'A property of special and peculiar value". The Tennessee Supreme
Court and the Law of Manumission, in ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: LAW,
THE CONSTITUTION AND SLAVERY 210 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989).
[The Tennessee Supreme] Court singled out humanity as the
characteristic that gave slave property a "peculiar nature and
character." The slave's humanity did not lessen his standing as
property. Rather, the Court focused on humanity as the factor that
conferred particular value on slave property ....
Humanity not only made slave property uniquely valuable, but, as
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice John Catron put it, in slaves "the
rights of humanity combined themselves with the rights of property."
Id. at 210-11 (footnotes omitted).
115. This decision, while a first-order decision, is simultaneously a second-order
decision as well because it is a decision that Africans introduced into the United
States after January 1, 1808 are ineligible to participate in the slave society.
116. See supra Part II.
117. See supra notes 77-78 (discussing the actual fate of the Antelope
Africans allocated to the United States), 49 (discussing the hazards of
colonization for Africans) and accompanying text.
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resent first-order decisions because at each point the
government, both state and federal, decided the degree to
which it would recognize a property interest in the Afri-
cans. 118 These pre-lottery choices established "the scope of
the [Africans'] entitlement to be free from injury," which
competed with the claimants' right to not be divested
wrongfully of their property. 119
Justice Johnson's opinion reveals several important
second-order decisions, decisions about who will be bene-
fited or burdened, such as the decision to exclude women
and girls from the lottery to determine the United States'
allocation. 120 Similarly, the decision to allow all of the men
and boys to participate in the lottery was a second-order de-
cision. 121 Instead, the court could have required the claim-
ants to produce evidence regarding the actual men and boys
originating from the Exchange, and then allocate only these
Africans to the United States. According to the lower court,
only the Africans originating from the Exchange were enti-
tled to be allocated to the United States, and they were all
male. 122 When the lower court decided to allow all men and
boys to participate in the lottery to establish the United
States' allocation, the court effectively created an opportu-
nity to benefit some men and boys who, according to the
binding law of the time, were not entitled to be benefited
because they did not originate from the Exchange.123
Resorting to weighted lotteries, meaning casting lots
after engaging in first- and second-order decisions, is a
choice to diminish the randomness of the lottery's results
and to do so in a way that permits government to avoid
public accountability. 124 Attention is diverted away from the
first- and second-order decisions and instead is placed on
118. See discussion supra Part III.A.
119. POSNER, supra note 3, at 325.
120. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (defining second-order
decisions). The evidence before the court was that only men and boys had been
removed from the Exchange. Thus, Justice Johnson directed that only males
were allowed to participate lottery. See NOONAN, supra note 21, at 66.
121. See supra Part II.
122. See id.
123. See id.




the actual mechanism for casting lots. The Antelope is a
compelling example of the masking effect of casting lots and
demonstrates how casting lots focuses attention away from
government accountability for the pre-lottery choices that
necessitated the casting of lots in the first instance.125 The
masking effect is not merely an historical consequence of
casting lots. As revealed in Part V, the masking effect
impacts contemporary lotteries and acts as a shield between
government and its constituents. 126
One might inquire, assuming that casting lots predis-
poses decisions to some form of masking effect, what is the
harm? Must government decisions be fully transparent to
protect the public interest in the distribution of property
entitlements and other governmental resources? My thesis
is that casting lots frequently undermines government's
ability to achieve distributive justice thereby resulting in
unjust property allocations. 127 Weighted lotteries have the
harmful effect of diverting public attention away from the
pre-lottery choices that may be biased in ways that skew
the distributional effect in a manner that makes attaining
distributive justice difficult if not impossible. 128 Moreover,
to reach just distributions of property, decision-makers
must inquire into what allocation method would result in
substantive and procedural fairness and equality for all of
the participants. 129 The actual process of casting lots cannot
inquire into fairness and equality concerns. Arguably, the
randomness alone of the procedural process of casting lots
is a guarantor of fairness and equality130 but, as mentioned
above, casting lots rarely is the sole mechanism for making
decisions. 131 It is typically preceded by the first- and second-
order decisions that, by definition, keep it from being purely
random.132 And, even if one were able to imagine a "pure"
125. See supra Part III, III.B.
126. See infra Part V.
127. Supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.
128. See infra Part IV.
129. Id.
130. E.g., ECKHOFF, supra note 80, at 305 (stating that the randomness of
casting lots makes the process attractive to some because of the belief that the
randomness protects participants from bias, implicitly making the lottery fair).
131. See supra Part III.A.
132. Id.
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lottery, this form of lottery also highlights the governmen-
tal decisions creating scarcity and the need to make choices
that are tragic for certain participants; further, pure lot-
teries, like weighted ones, do not account for individual
characteristics, merit, or public desire. 133
Distributive justice concerns are intricately involved
in the debate over casting lots. Understanding the interac-
tion between casting lots and distributive justice helps focus
attention on the truly central issues of why, in some
instances, there are insufficient resources for everyone to
have an adequate portion and what creates the need for
tragic choices; are they inevitable or typically the result of
poor governmental decision-making predating the tragic
choice?
IV. ACHIEVING DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
A. Distributive Justice and Property Law
Distributive justice is at the core of property law. 134
While a certain degree of inequality in property distribution
is unavoidable, excessive inequality prevents the victims of
distributive injustice from benefiting from the private prop-
erty system in a meaningful way. 135
In fact, the values that justify recognition of private property in
the first place also demand concern for distributive fairness and
for a substantial level of equality.
Property requires neither that we acquiesce in the inequality it
creates, nor that we commit to realizing an impossible ideal of
absolute equality, but a willingness to establish a base level of
equality that gives every person the ability to enter the property
133. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 145-46.
134. "[T]he degree of solution of the problem of distributive justice, or the
equitable distribution of the rewards available in a society, is the most
important determinant of individual satisfaction and effectiveness and of social
peace." George C. Homans, Book Review, 27 AM. Soc. REV. 270 (1962)
(reviewing ELLIOTT JAQUES, EQUITABLE PAYMENT: A GENERAL THEORY OF WORK,
DIFFERENTIAL PAYMENT, AND INDIVIDUAL PROGRESS (1961)); see also ECKHOFF,
supra note 80, at 205.
135. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY
163 (2000).
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system on terms that are fair and the means necessary to sustain
a dignified human life. 13 6
Therefore, I use a distributive justice analysis to explore the
propriety of casting lots to allocate property.
Distributive justice is a difficult concept to define.137
But, this difficulty does not preclude one from offering a
workable definition, one that incorporates thoughts from
noted scholars and philosophers, to encourage an analysis
of whether casting lots yields just property allocations. This
article does not attempt to explore all of the many defini-
tions and developments of distributive justice; rather, for
purposes of the randomness discussion and analysis,
distributive justice is concerned with how government
articulates and implements just "principles for the evalua-
tion of allocations of harms and benefits. 13s It applies the
theories of several scholars and philosophers and also
explores distributive justice through vignettes or analogies
when appropriate.
Generally, distributive justice requires both fairness
and the minimization of unjustified inequality; therefore,
consideration of fairness and equality principles is impor-
tant in ascertaining whether casting lots reliably produces
distributively just allocations. 139 John Rawls articulates the
following theory of justice:
136. Id. at 162.
137. See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in
International Environmental Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 843, 897 (2002) (stating that
justice has always been difficulty to define). Scholars and writers have pondered
the meaning of the "justice" for ages. I BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE: A
TREATISE ON SOCIAL JUSTICE 3 (Brian Barry et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter BARRY,
THEORIES]. There emerge not one but many theories of justice and on varying
levels. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 16-19 (2001).
Distributive justice, "justice in the distribution by the state of money,
honors .... other things of value[, and burdens]... requires distribution
according to merit." POSNER, supra note 3, at 313.
138. KAROL EDWARD SOLTAN, THE CAUSAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 13 (Brian
Barry et al. eds., 1987). Justice at its core is concerned with inequality among
people. See BARRY, THEORIES, supra note 137, at 145-46, 354-57.
139. Distributive justice requires both impartiality and minimization of
unjustified inequality. See, e.g., Carol Necole Brown, Taking the Takings Claim:
A Policy and Economic Analysis of the Survival of Takings Claims After
Property Transfers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 7 (2004) (discussing regulatory takings
and justice); see also GOODWIN, supra note 2, at 34 (discussing justice in the
context of a procedural device for distributing benefits and burdens); SINGER,
ENTITLEMENT, supra note 135, at 144 (2000). "Decentralization promotes justice
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[F]irst, each person participating in a practice, or affected by it,
has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a
like liberty for all; and second, inequalities are arbitrary unless it
is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone's
advantage, and provided the positions and offices to which they
attach, or from which they may be gained, are open to all. These
principles express justice as a complex of three ideas: liberty,
equality, and reward for services contributing to the common
good.140
Rawls' idea of justice "conveys the idea that the princi-
ples of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is
fair."141 Rawls' conception of justice popularized the theory
that the justness of a distribution may be determined only
when decision-makers, responsible for allocating benefits
and burdens, arrive at their decisions after operating
behind a "veil of ignorance" in which there is no "vestige of
bias, knowledge, or future prediction on the part of' the de-
cision-makers. 142  In their "original position" decision-
makers are ignorant of their personal condition and circum-
stances and cannot predict how their various options will
affect their particular situation. 43 Therefore, they must
evaluate distributive principles based solely upon general
considerations. The condition of the original position
ensures that the persons subject to the decisions are treated
as moral persons, both equally and fairly.
Fairness doctrines contemplate both substantive and
procedural justice questions. 144 One definition of substan-
by recognizing the dignity and equality of each individual. It promotes the
utilitarian goal of maximizing human satisfaction by creating the conditions
necessary for economic efficiency and social welfare. These justice and
utilitarian goals often go together." Id.; John Stuart Mill, "Social Justice and
Utility," from UTILITARIANISM (1861), reprinted in WHAT IS JUSTICE?: CLASSIC
AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 167 (Robert C. Solomon & Mark C. Murphy eds.,
2d ed. 2000) (stating that justice requires impartiality).
140. JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 48 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
141. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORYOFJUSTICE 11 (rev. ed., 1999).
142. E-mail from Mark Drumbl, Assistant Professor, Washington and Lee
University School of Law, to Blake Morant, Professor and Director, Frances
Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University School of Law (Feb. 24,
2004, 11:07 EST) (on file with author); RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 141, at 17.
143. Howard F. Chang, Immigration and the Workplace: Immigration
Restrictions as Employment Discrimination, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 291, 295
(2003); RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 141, at 17.
144. See ELSTER, SOLOMONIC, supra note 79, at 113. See generally Been,
supra note 103, at 1028-68 (discussing the various meanings of fairness as a
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tive justice is "the fair distribution of social costs and bene-
fits."'145 Substantive justice considerations are outcome-
oriented and require subjective decisions regarding what
outcome, distribution, or allocation is best under the given
circumstances. Determining whether substantive justice
has been attained necessarily requires an inquiry into what
constitutes fairness under a given set of circumstances. 146
For example, one theory of substantive fairness requires
equal division.147 The equal division concept has a strong
and a weak version. 148 The strong version requires a pro-
portional distribution of benefits; the weak version requires
a proportional distribution of burdens. 149
John Stuart Mill offers a utilitarian perspective on sub-
stantive justice and stresses the impact of decisions on the
common good as a measure of substantive justice. 150
According to Mill, personal happiness is a good to the indi-
vidual and general happiness is a benefit to all persons. 151
theoretical basis for siting locally undesirable land uses). Rawls asserts that if
one is to attempt to construct a theory of justice, one must first start with some
intuition of what would be fair or just courses of action in certain given cases.
RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 141, at 4; see also Erik Luna, Principled
Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515 (2000) (discussing the
need to predicate enforcement on procedural justice).
145. Luna, supra note 144, at 623; see also RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 141,
at 50-52.
146. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
147. See Been, supra note 103, at 1028; Michael H. Shapiro, Regulation as
Language: Communicating Values by Altering the Contingencies of Choice, 55 U.
PITT. L. REV. 681, 780 (1994).
148. Been, supra note 103, at 1029; see also ECKHOFF, supra note 80, at 37.
149. Been, supra note 103, at 1029. "Because exemptions from social
burdens are benefits, it follows that burdens such as [locally undesirable land
uses] should be proportionally distributed." Id. According to Professor Been, the
lottery procedure is fair under the weak version because it creates an equality
of opportunity whereby each potential recipient of a social burden has an equal
opportunity of being selected to receive the burden. See id. "It is unnecessary to
tackle the strong version of the theory... because if the burdens [in this
context] are proportionally distributed, the concomitant benefit of being free of
those burdens will necessarily be proportionally distributed." Id. at 1030.
150. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 53 (George Sher ed., 2d ed. 2001)
(1861) ("[T]he idea of justice supposes two things-a rule of conduct and a
sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common to all
mankind and intended for their good."); Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice:
The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70
IOWA L. REV. 769, 800 (1985).
151. Rosenfeld, supra note 150, at 800.
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"To determine whether an action is just requires measuring
any increase or decrease in the happiness of every individ-
ual affected by the action, and then to compute the net gain
or loss in happiness caused by such action."'152
Procedural justice is often approached from one of two
theories, although individuals have various conceptions of
procedural justice. 15 3  Pure procedural justice focuses
entirely on procedure; whatever the outcome of the proce-
dure, it is, by definition, just. 54 Rawls' "original position"
The metaphor that perhaps best illustrates the process whereby a
classical utilitarian would determine whether a particular action is just
is that of the rational and impartial sympathetic spectator. The
impartial spectator, unaffected by self-interest, examines the situation
from the perspective of each affected individual. At the end of the
process, the impartial spectator balances the nature and intensity of
the satisfactions and dissatisfactions experienced by those affected and
decides whether the action produced a net gain or loss of satisfaction.
Id. at 800-01.
152. Id. at 800.
153. See BARRY, THEORIES, supra note 137, at 265-66 (discussing pure
procedural justice); JUSTICE: VIEWS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 21 (Ronald L.
Cohen ed., 1986) (discussing perfect procedural justice); Been, supra note 103, at
1060-65. Been's theory of procedural fairness requires both a procedure that lacks
any intention to discriminate-in essence, the removal of self-interested
individuals from positions of decision-making authority-and the treatment of all
participants as equals. Id.; see also JOHN REES, EQUALITY 96 (1971) (discussing
different measures of equality, primarily numerical and proportional).
154. See BARRY, THEORIES, supra note 137, at 265-66. The demand for
administration of the laws in a nondiscriminatory way is a demand
[T]hat decisions should be made according to law: that only those
features of the situation recognized by the law should enter into the
determination of the case .... The second demand, that the laws
themselves should be nondiscriminatory, is satisfied to the extent that
the laws do not mandate or permit differential treatment of people who
are in all other respects similar (according to the legally prescribed
criteria of relevance) but differ in race, gender or some other
characteristic, where that characteristic should not be regarded are
relevant.
Id. A correct choice of the basic societal structure is essential to the
development of a system of rights and duties that will give way to justice in the
distribution of societal burdens and benefits. COHEN, supra note 153, at 21-22.
The relation of just procedures to just outcomes varies with the
limitations we meet. Sometimes it is possible to determine an
independent standard for deciding what outcome is just and to devise a
procedure for guaranteeing that outcome, but this is rare. More
frequently we can do one or the other but not both. For instance, we
may agree on what a just outcome would be but have no procedure that
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incorporates pure procedural justice principles. 15 5 The
original position's outcome defines "the appropriate princi-
ples of justice .... The essential feature of pure procedural
justice, as opposed to perfect procedural justice, is that
there exists no independent criterion of justice; what is just
is defined by the outcome of the procedure itself."'156
In contrast to pure procedural justice, perfect proce-
dural justice requires "both a criterion of a just outcome and
a fair procedure for ensuring the outcome."'157 An alterna-
tive but related definition of perfect procedural justice is
"the choice of institutions to implement 'an independent
and already given criterion' of what is just (or fair).' 158
Thus, perfect procedural justice has two important features.
First, it must be possible to discern an independent crite-
rion, defined independent of and prior to the followed pro-
cedure, for what constitutes a fair division. 159 Second, it
must be possible to devise a procedure that is certain to
produce the outcome that is desired.160
Harrington's Law is often cited as an example of a pro-
cedural mechanism that provides perfect procedural jus-
tice. 16 ' The spirit of Harrington's Law is that no division is
just if, after the division, any one participant would prefer
the portion allocated to another participant. 162 Harrington's
will guarantee that outcome. Or we may have no independent criterion
of a just outcome, and yet we have a fair procedure that, when
followed, gives a just outcome.
And often we can reach no agreement on what would be a just
outcome. In this case, we tend to rely on "pure procedural justice"-
agreeing that whatever results from following a fair procedure will be
fair.
Id.
155. See BARRY, THEORIES, supra note 137, at 266.
156. Id.
157. COHEN, supra note 153, at 21. When a procedure cannot be devised to
ensure a just outcome, this is an instance of "imperfect procedural justice." See id.
158. BARRY, THEORIES, supra note 137, at 265-66.
159. COHEN, JUSTICE, supra note 153, at 21.
160. Id.
161. See THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 172 (J.G.A. Pocock ed.,
1977) [hereinafter POLITICAL WORKS]; see also COHEN, supra note 153, at 21;
GOODWIN, supra note 2, at 198.
162. POLITICAL WORKS, supra note 161, at 172; COHEN, supra note 153, at 21.
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Law can be summarized in the sentence, "I divide, you
choose" and is more fully explained as follows: Two indi-
viduals are to divide a cake, the cake being symbolic of any
particular good or bad. If we assume that the fair division is
a division that results in an equal apportionment, what
procedure will assure a fair outcome? Harrington's Law
provides an answer.
That each of them therefore may have that which is due, "Divide,"
says ono unto the other, "and I will choose; or let me divide, and
you shall choose." If this be but once agreed upon, it is enough; for
the divident [sic] dividing unequally loses, in regard that the other
takes the better half; wherefore she divides equally, and so both
have right. 163
Overlapping and even conflicting conceptions of dis-
tributive justice do not undermine the relevance of distribu-
tive justice theory to the important question in both The
Antelope litigation and in the public school desegregation
context discussed in Part V-whether the casting of lots re-
sults in just property distributions.
Those who hold different conceptions of justice can ... still agree
that institutions are just when no arbitrary distinctions are made
between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and
when the rules determine a proper balance between competing
claims to the advantages of social life. Men can agree to this
description of just institutions since the notions of an arbitrary
distinction and of a proper balance, which are included in the
concept of justice, are left open for each to interpret according to
the principles of justice that he accepts. These principles single out
which similarities and differences among persons are relevant in
determining rights and duties and they specify which division of
advantages is appropriate. 64
B. The Antelope and Distributive Justice
By appearing to avoid conscious choice, casting lots pre-
tends to treat all participants equally and, in fact, scholars
contend that the equality of all participants is a precondi-
tion of any just lottery.165 Relatedly, lottery advocates con-
163. POLITICAL WORKS, supra note 161, at 172.
164. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 141, at 5.
165. See, e.g., Been, supra note 103, at 1029; REES, supra note 153, at 92
(defining equality); GOODWIN, supra note 2, at 29-30 (suggesting randomness
can lead to the reduction of unjustifiable inequality by its equalizing effect on
2005]
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tend that the lottery is just and fair in part because of the
impartiality resulting from its inherent randomness 166 and
in part because of the original choice to voluntarily enter
the lottery.167 A "theory of fairness as process would assert
that a distribution is fair as long as it results from a process
that was agreed upon in advance by all those potentially
affected."'168 If casting lots cannot result in distributive jus-
tice without the voluntary and informed consent of all par-
ticipants, one must carefully define lottery "participants" in
each casting of lots. 169
In The Antelope, if the Africans are the lottery partici-
pants, certainly they were not voluntary participants. 170
The lower court recommended the lottery and then selected
the eligible participants both for the lottery between Spain
and Portugal and for the lottery to establish the United
States' allocation. 171 Thus, a fundamental component of a
long term outcomes). The dominant feature of randomization is that no
characteristic of the individual affects the result of the draw. See DOUGLAS RAE
ET AL., EQUALITIES 66 (1981). "Randomness epitomizes a conception of
egalitarianism that treats everyone alike. As such, it clashes with other
conceptions, like 'to each according to his need,' which require differentiation."
CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 42.
166. See infra note 255 and accompanying text (discussing the removal of
self-interested decision-makers from the lottery process).
167. See GOODWIN, supra note 2, at 34, 44. Goodwin does acknowledge that
through ignorance, bad judgment, or other factors, individuals sometimes
voluntarily submit themselves to procedures and situations that are unjust;
however, in the context of distributive lotteries, she argues that "their
impartiality and foundational assumption of equality make them fair in the
process and just in the outcome unless more compelling reasons can be
advanced for non-random distribution." Id. at 34; see also JEAN JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 10, 13 (Charles Frankel ed., Hafner Publ'g Co.
1947) (1762) (criticizing the idea of the ability to voluntary consent to certain
types of burdensome relationships, specifically, slavery).
168. Been, supra note 102, at 1060; see also supra Part TV.A (discussing
procedural fairness).
169. See supra note 124 and accompanying text; see also GOODWIN, supra
note 2, at 34 (acknowledging the presence of voluntary consent does not
necessarily mean that a process is just as people sometimes feel compelled by
circumstances to consent to unjust processes).
170. The Africans could be considered participants in the same manner that
the Spanish and Portuguese owners might be considered participants. Consider the
United States government as representing the Africans and asserting their claims
of self-ownership just as Spain and Portugal represented their citizens' claims.
171. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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just lottery is absent in The Antelope.172 A tragic choice is
made from the participants' perspective, the consequences
of winning and losing are dire, but the participants are not
the ones choosing, nor are they allowed to opt out of the
random process.
Alternatively, if one defines the owners represented by
Spain and Portugal as the lottery participants as well as
the United States, then arguably only the United States is a
voluntary participant; Spain and Portugal are involuntary
participants. Spain and Portugal are part of the lottery
because the Dallas captured the Antelope at sea and
brought the Antelope, along with its contents, before the
courts in Georgia for the purpose of adjudicating the rights
of the relevant claimants to the Antelope and its property. 173
Essentially, Spain and Portugal had no viable alternative to
casting lots other than to abandon any property claim on
behalf of their citizens. According to this view, the Africans,
treated as property, were not entitled to choose whether or
not to participate. The Africans were the lottery res, analo-
gous to the monetary prize which is the res in most modern-
day lotteries.
The involuntary participation of Spain and Portugal in
the lottery deprives the lottery of its justness and fair-
ness. 174 The same arguments that apply in the case of the
Antelope Africans as involuntary participants apply to
Spain and Portugal. 175 The Spanish and Portuguese owners
are burdened by the lottery as a result of their involuntary
participation. The following is just one example of the bur-
den placed upon Spain and Portugal. To the extent that
some of the Antelope Africans were healthier, stronger, and
generally more fit than others, these Africans would be
commercially more valuable than their peers. Casting lots
subjected Spanish and Portuguese owners to being ran-
domly allocated a disproportionate number of the sickly and
weak, less commercially valuable, Africans.
172. Supra notes 129, 136-37 and accompanying text (discussing equality as
a component of a just lottery); supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text
(stating that voluntariness of lottery participation is necessary for the lottery
process to be fair).
173. See supra Part II.
174. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
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Treating the Antelope Africans as nonparticipants also
raises distributive justice concerns under Rawls' "veil of
ignorance" theory. 176 Certainly, the Spanish and Portuguese
owners would not have voluntarily subjected themselves to
the casting of lots if there had been a chance that they could
personally be selected to bear the burden of enslavement.
These owners, by means of casting lots, shielded themselves
from the burden of being a lottery loser, defined as one who
has to remain enslaved, and they also potentially benefited
from Africans being selected as losers because, of course,
these individuals would be recognized as their property.
The lower court focused on the fairness of casting lots from
the perspectives of Spain, Portugal, and the United States
and ignored the distributive justice question from the
Antelope Africans' perspective-was the actual decision to
choose by casting lots fair?177
Treating the Africans as nonparticipants would also
make casting lots substantively and procedurally unfair in
the following way. One theory is that substantive fairness
requires either proportional distribution of benefits (the
strong version) or proportional distribution of burdens (the
weak version). 78 According to some, procedural fairness re-
quires a nondiscriminatory procedure and equal treatment
of participants. 179 The Antelope demonstrates the lottery's
general inability to account for these definitions of substan-
tive and procedural fairness.
The lower court failed to treat all participants, defined
as all Africans on board the Antelope, equally. The court
would have excluded all women and girls from the proposed
lottery to determine the United States' allocation because
the evidence revealed that only men and boys were removed
from the Exchange, but it would have included all men and
boys when only a small portion of the males on the Antelope
originated from the Exchange. °80 Thus, women and girls
would have borne a disproportionate amount of the burden
176. See supra Part IV.A.
177. Casting lots raises at least two fairness questions: (1) when is the
actual casting of lots fair, and (2) when is it fair to choose to cast lots to make
allocations? See ELSTER, SOLOMONIC, supra note 79, at 113 n.250.
178. See supra Part IV.A.
179. See id.
180. See supra Part II.
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under the proposed lottery. Some men and boys would have
been disproportionately benefited by being eligible to par-
ticipate in the lottery to decide the United States' allocation
even though they did not originate from the Exchange.81
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
lottery, thus allowing some women and girls to be allocated
to the United States. 8 2 Any women and girls in whom the
Spanish claimants could not establish a property interest
by sufficient proof would necessarily be delivered to the
United States. 8 3
One could argue that the exclusion of women and girls
from the lottery to decide the United States' allotment was
the result of a neutral rule that said, where there is conclu-
sive evidence that an African did not originate from the
Exchange, that African shall not be allowed to participate in
the lottery to determine the United States' allocation. This
view also fails to achieve substantive fairness. 8 4 Not all
men and boys on the Antelope originated from the
Exchange; some had been transported from Spanish and
Portuguese ships.185 Nevertheless, the lower court would
have permitted all men and boys to participate in the lot-
tery to determine the United States' allocation even given
the same lack of evidence of origin as existed with regard to
women and girls.' 8 6
Procedural fairness may require proportional equality
so that when relevant factors are taken into account, such
as need, fitness, desert, status, and position, the formal
method of the allocation is identical. 187 Thus, "[e]quality
181. The corollary is that men and boys originating from the Exchange, but
not selected, would be unfairly burdened. Cf. HOBSON, PAPERS, supra note 67, at
157 (stating that at least one African "who had been certified free by the lottery
employed in the original circuit court decree" was identified by sufficient proof
by the Spanish claimant and turned over).
182. See supra Part II.
183. Id.
184. See Been, supra note 103, at 1029.
185. See supra Part II.
186. Id.
187. REES, supra note 153, at 92 (stating that "proportional equality has
regard to the relative merits of the persons concerned." In contrast, numerical
equality requires everyone to receive identical treatment regardless of
individual and circumstantial differences); see also RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS,
supra note 137, at 48; Jon Elster, Some Unresolved Problems in the Theory of
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demands, not just permits, not only that those similarly
situated be treated similarly, but that those dissimilarly
situated be treated dissimilarly."'188 Again, The Antelope
demonstrates the inequality inherent in casting lots. For
example, the lower court, by suggesting that all of the men
and boys on board the Antelope should be eligible lottery
participants, did not attempt to determine which individual
men and boys actually originated from the Exchange, and
were, therefore, more "deserving" based upon their
"status."189 As a result, African males originating from the
Exchange were in jeopardy of not being selected in the lot-
tery to determine the United States' allocation and could
have lost their "entitlement" to be selected to males origi-
nating from either Spanish or Portuguese ships.
Equality theory requires attention to the equality
among advantaged groups but also to equality between ad-
vantaged groups and disadvantaged groups. 190 The Antelope
court elevated the claimants' property interests, the advan-
taged group, above the liberty interests of the Africans, the
disadvantaged group, which fundamentally undermined the
equality necessary for the lottery mechanism to result in
distributive justice.19 1 The advantaged group benefited from
opting out of the lottery and the attendant burdens imposed
Rational Behavior, 36 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 179, 181 (1993). To the extent
inequality exists, the primary issue is whether the inequality between and
among people in terms of their relations is defensible. Id.
188. Michael H. Shapiro, The Role of Ethics & Law: On the Possibility of
'Progress" in Managing Biomedical Technologies: Markets, Lotteries, and
Rational Moral Standards in Organ Transplantation, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 13, 50
(2003) (hereinafter Biomedical Advances]. See Eckhoff, supra note 80, at 31-37
(discussing absolute and relative equality); Elster, Unresolved Problems, supra
note 187, at 181; Shapiro, Regulation as Language, supra note 147, at 781
(discussing components of fungibility that enhance fairness, equality and
personal autonomy).
189. See supra Part II; supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (defining
desert and status).
190. Supra notes 129, 136, 137 and accompanying text (discussing
nondiscriminatory laws and nondiscriminatory procedures as elements of
equality theory and stating that equality requires decision-makers to be just as
attentive to the needs of the advantaged as to the needs of those who are
disadvantaged); see supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text (discussing an
alternative view of Spanish and Portuguese owners and the United States as
the relevant participants).
191. Supra notes 129, 136-137, 169-171.
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on the losers and the disadvantaged group was forced into
the lottery.
The challenge of distributive justice is one of assigning
rights under a general system of predictable and reliable
rules. 192 In the law, participants in the legal process value
reasoned and responsible decision-making. Responsible
decision-making, or taking responsibility, has two dimen-
sions-forward and backward-looking. 193  The forward-
looking dimension implicates the qualities of "acceptance,
commitment, care, and concern" while the backward-look-
ing orientation emphasizes reward and punishment, blame,
praise, mitigation, and excuses. 194 For purposes of this arti-
cle, accountable and responsible decision-making is both
forward-looking and backward-looking, requiring: (1) the
exercise of good judgment, (2) the giving of due considera-
tion based upon the matter in question, and (3) an empha-
sis on attaining justice. 195
The concept of taking responsibility manifests itself in
numerous ways. 196 First, taking responsibility may impli-
cate the administrative, also known as the managerial,
sense which involves organizing and sizing up possibilities
192. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165,
1221-22 (1967). Professor Michelman discusses the value of predictability and
consistency in the context of taking jurisprudence and compensation decisions.
He notes that citizens will only view disadvantageous government treatment as
fair if they can perceive the particular decision as evidence of an overall general
practice that is consistently applied. Id. Thus, predictability of rules and
practices is fundamental to a just distributive system. "More fully, if law and
government act effectively to keep markets competitive, resources fully
employed, property and wealth widely distributed over time, and to maintain
the appropriate social minimum, then if there is equality of opportunity
underwritten by education for all, the resulting distribution will be just."
RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 140, at 140. Equality of opportunity in
this context refers not to an equal random chance at receiving a benefit or of
being passed over for a burden; instead, it refers to equality of rights and of
access to legal and societal processes and institutions. Id. at 161 (stating that
those similarly situated in terms of ability and motivation should have similar
prospects for success).
193. CLAUDIA CARD, THE UNNATURAL LOTTERY: CHARACTER AND MORAL LUCK
25 (1996).
194. Id. at 25-26.
195. Id. at 27.
196. Id. at 28.
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in a comprehensive way. 197 Second, taking responsibility
may be viewed from the care-taking perspective in which an
individual or entity is dedicated to supporting and following
through with an agenda. 198 Third, taking responsibility may
also implicate a sense of accountability-agreeing to be
liable or answerable for something. 199 Finally, taking re-
sponsibility can refer to "the credit sense of responsibility-
owning up to having been the (morally) relevant cause of
something's happening or not happening, taking the credit
(or blame) for it. ' 200 The first three perspectives are all for-
ward-looking and require the responsible party to under-
take a task consciously and then follow through. This is the
antithesis of randomness and casting lots. The very nature
of randomness is that it inserts chance as a decision-maker
as a substitute for taking the initiative to engage in an
undertaking and to follow through with that undertaking.
Likewise, the backward-looking credit sense of responsibil-
ity is inapposite to randomness. It requires initiative just as
the forward-looking dimensions do.
Decision-makers "are more responsible when they take
responsibility in a sense that shows initiative than when
they do not."' 20' I do concede that there may be limited cir-
cumstances in which the lottery and randomness may be an
acceptable way to allocate the burdens and benefits of
scarce resources. 20 2 Examples of such situations would be
instances in which there are no merit-based or other com-
pelling reasons to prefer certain persons or groups when
allocating scare resources or entitlements.20 3 Because of the
197. Id. The administrative or managerial perspective is forward-looking.
198. Id. The care-taking sense of responsibility is a forward-looking
perspective.
199. Id. The accountability sense of responsibility is a forward-looking
perspective.
200. Id. at 28. The credit sense of responsibility is a backward-looking
perspective.
201. Id. at 28-29.
202. See supra Parts III-V and accompanying notes and text; but cf. Pauline
T. Kim, The Colorblind Lottery, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 9 (2003). "In certain
circumstances, an unbiased lottery may well be a sensible way of allocating
unavoidable burdens or of distributing scarce resources." Id. at 12. The
difficulty this article expresses is that it is nearly impossible to construct a truly
"unbiased" lottery.
203. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing Parents Involved
in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 377 F.3d 949, reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 1168
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rarity of such situations, randomness generally fails to
promote the accountable and responsible decision-making
upon which the American legal system has grown to rely.
Neil Duxbury acknowledges that lotteries may seem
rational, impartial, and cost-efficient. 20 4 However, he also
acknowledges a tendency to be dissatisfied in the legal
arena with decisions reached by casting lots:
The process of legal decision-making is generally, if often only
implicitly, considered to be more important than the quality of
decision reached; and so a highly contentious legal decision
furnished with reasons is likely to meet with greater approval
than would a genuinely impartial (and, in consequentialist terms,
welcome) decision arrived at by lot ....
* [W]hat we seek, particularly in legal decision-making, is not
right answers but attributable answers-answers for which
somebody can be held responsible or accountable. More than this,
we commonly want legal answers which are serious as well as
attributable-answers, that is, which are furnished with reasons
as opposed to being based on instinct or caprice or some other
emotional response.205
Citizens want to be confident in the legal system's deci-
sions. They also want to be certain that reasoned, founda-
tional principles underlie the legal system.206 Lotteries, by
their nature, are fundamentally unreasoned and unex-
plained because of their randomness. 20 7 Therefore, their use
(9th Cir. 2005)). Seattle School District may be used to support an argument
that lotteries may be appropriate in the limited circumstances.
204. DUXBURY, supra note 80, at 14.
Aversion to decision-making by lot is, I believe, indicative of a distinct
attraction, possibly even an addiction, to reason. It is possible to
envisage instances in which resort to lot will produce decisions that are
impartial and extremely cost-efficient and in which, moreover,
reasoning one's way to a decision will most likely take considerable
time and expose one to the accusation of partiality. Yet, even in these
cases, there rarely exists any inclination to decide by resort to sortition.
Id.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 144.
207. See supra Parts II and III.
Human beings do not simply have material and emotional needs. They
also have, for whatever evolutionary reasons, intellectual needs. One
such need is the need to find meaning and patterns in the events we
observe. This need is satisfied by genuinely scientific theories, but also
by pseudoscientific views of all sorts .... Another is the need to have
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in making decisions with legal consequences offends gener-
ally recognized notions of distributive justice. 20 8
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court rejected
the lottery and placed the burden on the party who would
deny the Africans their freedom, the Spanish claimants, to
designate by proof the specific Africans to whom they were
entitled.20 9 Essentially, the Court adopted Francis Scott
Key's argument that proof by random allocation in the form
of casting lots was an unsatisfactory allocative mecha-
nism.210  The Supreme Court demonstrated that the
assignment of rights and burdens based upon chance is an
anomaly in a legal system premised on the notion of rights
and relief correlated to individualized factors and a belief in
distributive justice.211
V. CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES OF CASTING LOTS: THE
MASKING FUNCTION AND THE DECEPTIVENESS OF THE NOTION
OF JUSTICE BY LOTTERY
Scholars and lawyers have laid a foundation for a prop-
erty interest in a minimal level of education. 21 2 Thus, it is
and be able to cite reasons for our actions and decisions. Sometimes we
know that we could find the decision that would have been optimal if
found costlessly and instantaneously. By investing more time, effort
and money we may be able to rank the options. We may also know, or
be in a position to know, that the benefits from finding out are small
compared to these costs. Yet because of what one might call an
addition to reason we do not use a lottery but go on looking for reasons,
until eventually we find one.
Elster, Unresolved Problems, supra note 187, at 183.
208. See supra Part IV; see also Elster, Unresolved Problems, supra note
187, at 183.
209. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 at 130.
210. Id. at 131-32. See NOONAN, supra note 21, at 97-98.
211. See generally POSNER, supra note 3, at 334-48 (disavowing the notion
that distributive justice can be achieved by lottery; rather, according to Posner,
achieving distributive justice requires distribution based upon merit).
212. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 1, at 771.
Property is a legal institution the essence of which is the creation and
protection of certain private rights in wealth of any kind. The
institution performs many different functions. One of these functions is
to draw a boundary between public and private power. Property draws
a circle around the activities of each private individual or organization.
Within that circle, the owner has a greater degree of freedom than
without. Outside, he must justify or explain his actions, and show his
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timely to discuss the role of casting lots as a means of
securing distributive justice in the public school education
context. Achieving distributive justice in public school edu-
cation requires attention to myriad issues.213 For example,
initial education reform litigation focused on eliminating
authority. Within, he is master, and the state must explain and justify
any interference. It is as if property shifted the burden of proof;
outside, the individual has the burden; inside, the burden is on
government to demonstrate that something the owner wishes to do
should not be done.
Thus, property performs the function of maintaining independence,
dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones within which the
majority has to yield to the owner.
Id. In this same vein, Professor Reich lays the foundation for an argument in
support of a property interest in an adequate public education. Id. at 737. See
William P. Quigley, Due Process Rights of Grade School Students Subjected to
High-Stakes Testing, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 284, 295 (2001).
Appellate courts in the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Tenth Circuits, along with other district courts, have all proceeded
under the assumption that students possess protected due process
property rights in academic issues. These courts have found property
interests in academic matters based in interpretations of state law or
based on implied mutual understandings on behalf of the educational
institution and the student.
Id.; see Paul T. O'Neill, HIGH STAKES TESTING LAW AND LITIGATION, 2003 BYU
EDUC. & L.J. 623, 636.
Denial by the government of a benefit to which a person has a
legitimate claim of entitlement encroaches on a property interest and
therefore requires procedural due process. This right is just as
applicable in a school setting as elsewhere: "Among other things, the
State is constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a
public education as a property interest which is protected by the Due
Process Clause ... "
Id.; see Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program Inadequacy:
The Alabama Example, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 559, 567 (1995) (discussing a
right to an adequate education as a guarantee of the Alabama Constitution as
well as of the Federal Constitution).
213. See, e.g., Morgan et al., supra note 212, at 567; Stewart G. Pollock,
School Finance in the Courts, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 133, 138 (1998)
(discussing equality theory and adequacy theory approaches to public education
justice concerns); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-77 (1986)
(discussing attempts to ameliorate the effects of racial discrimination in hiring
teachers such as the negative impact on students lacking minority role models);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) (discussing an equality
theory approach by successfully challenging the doctrine of separate but equal
public educations for minority and nonminority students).
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dual-education systems based upon race 214 and the inherent
inequalities in educational opportunities that attended the
dual system. 215 Later, education initiatives focused on
equality (also referred to as equity) and adequacy
approaches to distributive justice. 216 Under a purely formal
equality theory, a school system may be found legally suffi-
cient under a distributive justice analysis if available
educational resources are equitably distributed among all
students, even if the quality of the education each receives
is objectively poor. 21 7 When people demand equal or equita-
214. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF
PROPERTY 164 (2000) (stating generally that the status quo results in part from
past discrimination). Singer suggests that the legal system should not defer to
systems, preferences, and divisions of wealth and entitlements predicated on
racial discrimination; rather, the legal system should be committed to changing
such biased systems toward the end of becoming more just. See id. Change,
lasting change, reflects the exercise of sound and unbiased judgment, not
arbitrariness. See id. at 165 (analogizing the toss of a coin to arbitrary decision-
making as contrasted with the exercise of judgment).
215. E.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267; Brown, 347 U.S. at 493; Morgan et al.,
supra note 212, at 559. Segregated schools result from many forms of de jure
and de facto discrimination. For example, blacks have historically been limited
in their ability to gain access to the better neighborhoods in which the better
public schools are located. "The spatial isolation of black Americans was
achieved by a conjunction of racist attitudes, private behaviors, and
institutional practices.... Discrimination in employment exacerbated black
poverty and limited the economic potential for integration, and black residential
mobility was systematically blocked by pervasive discrimination and white
avoidance of neighborhoods containing blacks." DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE
UNDERCLASS 83 (1993).
216. See Morgan et al., supra note 212, at 560; Pollock, supra note 213, at
138; notes 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing equal division as intricate
to the distributive justice analysis).
217. See Morgan et al., supra note 212, at 560; see also supra notes 198-200
and accompanying text (discussing equity theory); cf. RAWLS, COLLECTED
PAPERS, supra note 140, at 165; Been, supra note 103, at 1064 ("[I]f a siting
process is more attentive to the interests of wealthier or white neighborhoods
than to the interests of poor or minority neighborhoods, that process
illegitimately treats the poor and people of color as unequal.").
[T]he principle of redress holds that in order to treat all persons
equally, to provide genuine equality of opportunity, society must give
more attention to those with fewer native assets and to those born into
the less favorable social positions. The idea is to redress the bias of
contingencies in the direction of equality. In pursuit of this principle
greater resources might be spent on the education of the less rather
than the more intelligent, at least over a certain time of life, say, the
earlier years of school.
CASTING LOTS
ble treatment under the law they desire two things: "that
the laws should be administered in a non-discriminatory
way and that the laws themselves should not be discrimina-
tory."2 18
In comparison to a purely formal equality theory, ade-
quacy theory inquires not only into the level of education
students receive relative to other students but, equally as
important, adequacy theory holds that all students are enti-
tled to, in absolute terms, a minimal level of education suf-
ficient to prepare them to pursue post-secondary educa-
tional opportunities or to directly enter the workforce and
contribute meaningfully to society. 219 Adequacy and equal-
ity theories should be considered jointly when addressing
distributive justice in public education. 220
This Part inquires into distributive justice and the illu-
sion of justice in the allocation of public education opportu-
nities primarily by considering Belk v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,2 21 a recent Fourth Circuit
case in which the court considered the propriety of using a
Id.
218. 2 BRIAN BARRY, JUSTICE AS IMPARTIALITY: A TREATISE ON SOCIAL JUSTICE
227 (1995). The ideal lottery is accordingly characterized by an impartial
procedure and, simultaneously, the unequal treatment, measured by outcome, of
the individual participants. GOODWIN, supra note 2, at 103; RAE, supra note 165,
at 83. Professor Rae describes distribution by lot as one method of attaining
equality of opportunity. One of the salient characteristics of his construct of
equality of opportunity is that the results of the outcome are unaffected by the
characteristics or qualities of the participants. Id. at 83-91; see GOODWIN, supra
note 2, at 198. To the extent inequality exists, the primary issue is whether the
inequality between and among people in terms of their relations is defensible. See
generally Elster, Unresolved Problems, supra note 187, at 181.
219. Robert M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses in
State Constitutions, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1 (discussing various cases and
litigation approaches relying on equality and/or adequacy rationales and
arguing that education litigation is most successful when plaintiffs rely on the
education clauses of state constitutions to specifically allege that the quality of
public education is both inadequate and of poor quality); see Morgan et al.,
supra note 212, at 560; Pollock, supra note 213, at 138; BARRY, THEORIES, supra
note 134, at 356 ("[W]hen we look at educational institutions from the point of
view of justice, what we will tend to focus on is the role that they play in the
transmission of occupational positions from generation to generation."); cf.
supra note 88 and accompanying text (citing Calabresi and Bobbitt and their
criticism of pure lotteries as emphasizing governments inability of
unwillingness to create an absolute right to adequate resources).
220. Morgan et al., supra note 212, at 560.
221. 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002).
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weighted lottery to integrate the public schools. While there
are innumerable public education litigation cases, 222 Belk is
particularly compelling because of the significant role of the
lottery in achieving and maintaining a just educational sys-
tem.
Beginning in 1971, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools
("CMS") functioned under a desegregation plan that was
supervised and monitored by the federal courts. 223 For al-
most twenty years, CMS maintained racial balance in its
public schools; however, demographic changes and popula-
tion growth threatened that balance. 224 In response, CMS
decided to implement a program based upon volunteerism,
a magnet school program, "because CMS 'wanted to attract
more white youngsters into the inner city schools' in order
to meet CMS's racial-balance goals."225 CMS sought a forty-
percent black, sixty-percent white ratio under the magnet
school program with an acceptable deviation being plus or
minus fifteen percent. 226 To achieve these goals, CMS' ad-
missions process required that CMS first fill seats by
granting preferences to students living in close geographic
proximity to the school and to those with a sibling already
attending the particular magnet school. 227 Next, CMS
would "fill[] the remaining seats by selecting students from
a black lottery and a non-black lottery until the precise ra-
cial balance [was] achieved. '228 If sufficient numbers of
white or black students did not apply and therefore did not
fill the seats allotted to their respective racial group, the
seats remained vacant.229
222. See Quigley, supra note 197, at 295.
223. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir.
2001).
224. Id. at 336.
225. Id. (citation omitted).
226. Id. at 337.
227. Id. One of the vulnerabilities of weighted lotteries is that the factors
used to weight the lotteries do not necessarily reflect relevant, substantive
criteria. See supra notes 105-09; infra note 265 and accompanying text
(discussing desert, need, position, fitness, and productivity as relevant,
substantive criteria); infra Part IV and accompanying text (discussing the
elusive benefits of the lottery taking account of the impact of weighting).
228. Belk, 269 F.3d at 337 (citation omitted).
229. Id. "Though some exceptions were made, Superintendent Eric Smith
testified that CMS generally adhered to the policy." Id.
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A white student challenged CMS's magnet school ad-
missions policy. The district court found that CMS' race-
conscious magnet school admissions program violated the
Equal Protection Clause because the program "was not nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of
remedying past discrimination. '230
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
trict court's decision. 231 The court of appeals acknowledged
that CMS had achieved an integrated, unitary school system,
in contrast to the historically segregated school system it
once operated. 232 But the court of appeals also found that,
prior to the district court's decision, no court had determined
that CMS had achieved unitary status.233 Thus, at the time
CMS implemented its magnet school admissions program,
CMS's status was "as a dual school district under multiple
court orders to desegregate its schools. '234 The court of ap-
peals stated the following regarding CMS's obligations and
duties given its status:
A person or entity subject to a judicial decree or injunction (as
CMS indisputably was when operating its dual, segregated school
230. Id.
231. Id. at 370.
At the outset, we note that it is undisputed that this
expanded magnet schools program differs in critical respects from all
race-based student assignment plans that have been held to be in
conflict with the Equal Protection Clause. Unlike school districts found
to have violated the Constitution, CMS adopted the challenged
program while operating a dual, segregated school system, under a
myriad of court orders commanding the Board to eliminate the
unlawful segregation.
In concluding that the expanded magnet schools program violated the
Constitution, the district court committed two fatal errors. Initially, it
ignored the extent of the protection afforded an entity governed by
federal court orders. Then, the district court refused to recognize the
broad directives and expansive terms of the controlling court orders, and
so failed to appreciate that the Board expanded its magnet schools
program in good faith to comply with these orders, and thus cannot be
held to have violated the Constitution. The dissent replicates both errors.
Id. at 397, 399.
232. See id. at 398-99.
233. Id. at 398.
234. Id.
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system) must comply with that decree or injunction,
notwithstanding its possible unlawfulness. Thus, the Supreme
Court has clearly and unequivocally directed that "persons subject
to an injunctive order issued by a court with jurisdiction are
expected to obey that decree until it is modified or reversed, even if
they have proper grounds to object to the order."235
The court of appeals concluded by finding that CMS
was authorized to use ratios in making student assign-
ments and that it was also empowered to use "race-
conscious assignment policies for 'appropriately integrated
optional schools.' ' 236
Even assuming the appropriateness of the first-order
decisions leading to segregated and inadequate schools, the
second-order criteria used to weight the lottery should be
scrutinized to determine their efficiency 237 and justness in
235. Id. at 399 (citation omitted). "Moreover, a court order need not mandate
specific or precise procedures to compel obedience." Id.
236. Id. at 402 (citation omitted). The administrators in Belk weighted the
lottery to provide a geographic preference and a sibling preference. Id. at 337.
Although not present in Belk, courts of appeal such as the Ninth Circuit in Scott
v. Pasadena Unified School District have recently considered weighted
admissions lotteries in which the weighting criteria accounted for factors such
as "gender, race, or ethnicity, socioeconomic status, language and special
educational needs." Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 649-50
(9th Cir. 2002). The Pasadena Unified School District Board of Education
approved an "Integration Policy and Quality Schooling Plan." Id. at 649. The
policy allowed the Board to use a lottery system to assign students to voluntary
schools. The Board only used the lottery if a school had fewer available spaces
than applications. Id. at 649-50. The court reversed the district court granting
the plaintiffs summary judgment and dismissed all plaintiffs claims for failure
to establish Article III jurisdiction. Id. at 664.
237. See DAviD W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW
AND ECONOMICS 4 (1992). "Allocative efficiency means using scarce resources to
the greatest possible advantage .... Whether a particular use is efficient will
depend, by definition, on what exactly one wants to gain or accomplish." Id. at 6.
Focusing on efficiency rather than fairness does not make
economics a neutral and unbiased exercise. Directing resources to their
most valuable uses and measuring value according to willingness and
ability to pay biases allocations towards those with the greatest ability
to pay. Among individuals with equally strong desires to own a certain
house, the individual with the greater willingness and ability to
express that desire by giving up money or other resources is judged the
highest valuing user; allocating the resource to his use is, by definition,
allocatively efficient. Because efficiency analysis proceeds from a
preexisting set of endowments of wealth, it does not question whether
the initial distribution of "abilities to pay" is proper.
Id. at 17.
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combination with the lottery method. 238 The preferences
discussed in Belk as weighting factors-geographic, sibling,
and racial preferences-may be incorrect criteria for privi-
leging students, or even when correct, these criteria could
be applied inappropriately in the lottery context and could
result in an irrational allocative decision.239 Other criteria
with a history of use in weighting public education lotteries
include, in addition to the ones used in Belk, gender,
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and language. 240 The harm
of the masking effect of casting lots is that, without trans-
parent and responsible decision-making, the weighting
criteria could, in a deceptively innocuous manner, privilege
information flow or other factors and de-emphasize the im-
portance of the child in the selection process. Attention
would be deflected away from important concerns such as
whether the particular school is an appropriate fit for the
individual child or whether an appropriate level of ade-
quacy has been achieved. 241 Thus, the lottery masks not
only the historical decisions to create a scarcity of adequate
educational opportunities, it also masks the children's
helplessness.
An example of the shortcomings of using second-order
criteria to weight public education lotteries might be useful
in illustrating the point that casting lots does not predicta-
bly result in distributive justice. As mentioned earlier, edu-
cation litigation initially focused on dismantling dual
educational systems resulting from racial segregation. 242
Using race-conscious, pre-lottery selection criteria in public
238. See infra notes 223-29 and accompanying text. But see Hapgood, supra
note 2 (discussing the benefits of lotteries in the educational context).
239. See Shapiro, Biomedical Advances, supra note 184, at 47. "A
nonrational decision could be either choosing incorrect criteria for
distinguishing persons; applying the criteria incorrectly (e.g., using the wrong
test instrument to measure differential abilities); or, more controversially;
abandoning differential criteria altogether, leaving persons 'fungible' for the
purposes at hand." Id; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003)
(stating that employing a lottery system would sacrifice either diversity or the
academic quality of students gaining admission or both); Whiting v. Hamden
Bd. of Educ., 24 Conn. L. Rptr. 331 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (discussing
elimination of sibling preference policy).
240. See, e.g., Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646 (9th Cir.
2002).
241. See supra Part V.
242. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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education arguably addresses some distributive justice con-
cerns from the perspective of justice as fairness and the
elimination of arbitrary and unjustifiable inequalities. 243 It
does nothing to focus attention on problems of educational
scarcity resulting from inadequate funding and contributes
minimally, if at all, to a meaningful dialogue about how to
elevate, for all students, the overall quality of their public
school education. 244 Essentially, in this scenario casting lots
deflects attention away from questions of scarcity and
adequacy that are fundamental to the development of a just
public education system.
Moreover, applying Rawls' "veil of ignorance" theory,
few decision-makers in an "original position" would advo-
cate for casting lots, regardless of the weighting criteria, as
opposed to advocating for increased educational standards
and resources for all public school students.245 Such a deci-
sion-maker in the "original position" would not know
whether the decision-maker would have a child participat-
ing in the lottery or whether such a child would be a lottery
winner, by being selected to attend an academically strong
magnet school, or a lottery loser, by failing to secure a slot.
Also, the decision-maker would not know whether, in the
event of a losing result, he or she could afford to educate the
child privately, thereby compensating for the loss by fund-
ing an adequate educational experience out of the decision-
maker's own pocket.
State and local governments' most critical function is to
provide a system of adequate public schools. "[I]t is doubtful
that any child may be reasonably expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it,
is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms. ' 246 Having laid this foundation, it is evident that
243. See supra Part IV.A. and accompanying notes and text.
244. Id.; see also supra notes 219-220 and accompanying text (discussing
adequacy theory); infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text (discussing the
state of Alabama as one example of a state attempting to address public school
difficulties by improving public school funding). But cf. infra notes 250-52
(discussing findings which dispute the assertion that insufficient funding is a
major cause of the difficulties affecting public education).
245. See supra Part IV.A. and accompanying notes and text.
246. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973) (reaffirming its
statement in Brown of the importance of adequate public school education);
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admission into CMS magnet schools was a very valuable
"benefit" for parents of public school children.247 Failure to
obtain admission through the lottery process resulted in an
irreplaceably lost opportunity for losing children and their
parents.248 Thus, in a society that adopts an idea of justice
which holds that all children should receive an adequate
education, the notion that some children will be selected as
"losers" in the lottery represents a tragic choice. 249
The current status of public education in this country
reflects many first- and second- order choices by govern-
ment. 250 Thus, government has contributed to disparities in
educational opportunities and to inadequacies where they
exist.251 The choice to allow governments, federal, state, and
local, to be unaccountable and irresponsible is a decision to
Reich, supra note 1, at 737 ("The most important public service of all, education,
is one of the greatest sources of value to the individual.").
247. See Reich, supra note 1, at 737 (discussing education in the context of a
limited property interest); supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing
magnet schools in general).
248. See ELSTER, supra note 79, at 105 (noting that any allocation of a
burden can simultaneously be represented as the allocation of a good-meaning
the exemption from a burden. He further notes that lotteries are more willingly
used to allocate gains than losses.).
249. See ECKHOFF, supra note 80, at 218; see also Reich, supra note 1, at 737
(discussing education as one of the greatest societal values).
250. National Education Association, Rankings & Estimates: Rankings of the
States 2003 and Estimates of School Statistics 2004, at http://www.nea.org
edstats/images/04rankings.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2005). "Public education in
the United States is a joint enterprise between local, state, and federal
governments. Yet, progress in improving public education stems primarily from
the efforts of state education agencies, local districts, and individual schools."
Id. at vii.
251. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 215, at 36-41 (discussing the role of
local government, local communities, and real estate boards in creating legally
enforced housing segregation). Government's role in promoting housing
segregation helped further entrench segregated schools into the American
landscape and resulted in concentrated pockets of disadvantage. Id. at 141.
The organization of public schools around geographical catchment
areas, in other words, reinforces and exacerbates the social isolation
that segregation creates in neighborhoods. By concentrating low-
achieving students in certain schools, segregation creates a social
context in which poor performance is standard and low expectations
predominate.
Id.; see also supra Part V and accompanying notes; infra notes 253-54 and
accompanying text (discussing inadequate school funding specifically in
Alabama as an example of government's role in public school development).
124 BUFFALO LAWREVIEW [Vol. 53
create an environment in which future difficult decisions,
tragic choices, must be made in the public education arena.
Raising public consciousness about the process of achieving
distributive justice in education by creating adequate and
equal school systems is necessary for increased citizen confi-
dence in government. 252 Unless and until government is
more responsible, citizens are hesitant to increase govern-
ment empowerment. 25 3 This hesitation may be reflected in a
number of ways such as rejection of proposals to increase
public education funding at the expense of taxpayers or
challenges to remedial efforts aimed at addressing histori-
cally unequal and discriminatory treatment in the provision
of public education opportunities. 254 If society values predict-
able outcomes and believes every child is entitled to an equal
and adequate public education, casting lots is not the opti-
mal decision-making device for determining which children
shall benefit and which shall do without.25 5
252. See supra Part V; infra Part VI and accompanying notes (discussing the
need for government accountability, openness, honesty, and responsiveness).
253. Congressman Artur G. Davis, Address at The University of Alabama
School of Law, Law Democrats meeting (Mar. 1, 2004); e.g., Riley Calls for Session
on Reforms Proposes Cuts, Funds for Reading Initiative, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Feb.
4, 2004, at Al, A9 (stating that Alabamians want government to be open, honest,
and responsive); We Must All Do People's Work, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Feb. 4, 2004,
at A10 (discussing the importance of government accountability).
254. See supra Part V and accompanying notes; see e.g., Hubbert: State Must
Try Again to Raise Revenue, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept. 11, 2003, § B, at 2. Paul
Hubbert, executive secretary of Alabama's Education Association responded to
the 2 to 1 defeat of Governor Bob Riley's proposed $1.2 billion-a-year tax and
accountability referendum, nearly one-half of which was promised for public
schools, by stating that, next time, government must "be able to show voters
how the money will be used .. "; see also Nation's Top Teacher Upset Over Tax
Rejection, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept. 11, 2003, § B, at 2 (stating that National
Teacher of the Year, Betsy Rogers, was angered by the defeat of the Governor's
proposed tax and accountability plan).
255. But see ECKHOFF, supra note 80, at 305. Random selection is most
desired if the outcome is either very important or very unimportant to the
participants. Id. If the outcome is very important, randomness is desirable
because of (1) the decision-maker's need to be absolved of decision-making
responsibility and of any guilt associated with the outcome as well as because of
(2) the participants' need to feel they are protected from bias, which assumes
that there is no cheating and all incentive effects are controlled. See id. at 304;
see also infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text (discussing incentive effects).
If the outcome matters little, then no one will be bothered by the fact the results
were arrived at by using simple techniques. Id.
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VI. THE ALTERNATIVE TO RANDOMNESS
If lotteries are antithetical to rational, responsible deci-
sion-making, and if the latter type of decision-making
promotes socially desirable qualities such as government
accountability and distributive justice, what is the "better"
alternative to lotteries? Generations of citizens have strug-
gled, unsuccessfully, to develop a distributive system that:
(1) reflected the society's basic values and morals, whatever
they happened to be at the time; and (2) was capable of
being framed within a legal regime that procedurally al-
lowed the system to be implemented consistently. 256 What
does the lack of solutions to the problem of achieving pre-
dictable distributive justice in resource allocation, particu-
larly in instances of scarcity, reflect? Perhaps it reflects a
reality which holds that "there is in principle no set of con-
clusions that could properly be called a solution-if by
'solution' we mean some process and outcome that satisfies
all our basic values. '25 7
The alternative to randomness that this article offers is
that heightened emphasis should be placed on increasing
governments and citizens' awareness of historically unno-
ticed or under-emphasized moral and ethical considera-
tions, instead of focusing on developing specific substantive
and procedural processes that will result in distributive jus-
tice in all imaginable situations. A renewed commitment to
recognizing moral and ethical considerations as an indis-
pensable component of decision-making would result in
advancing progress toward rational and responsible deci-
sion-making.258 It would also serve as a guard against
suppressing information regarding important characteris-
tics and traits of individuals who will be impacted by the
decision-making process.
Certainly, one of the vulnerabilities of emphasizing
individual characteristics and traits is that decision-makers
will "unfairly" account for characteristics and traits so that
the advantaged groups will become further entrenched in
their privilege and the disadvantaged, relative to the
advantaged and in an absolute sense, will become even
256. See Shapiro, Biomedical Advances, supra note 188, at 14-15; supra Part IV.
257. Shapiro, Biomedical Advances, supra note 188, at 15.
258. See id. at 23; supra Part IV.
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more disadvantaged. 259 Government can address this diffi-
culty by directing resources to ensuring that the criteria used
to make individualized decisions are rationally and equitably
related to the resources or burdens being allocated. 260 Also,
and perhaps most importantly, the societal scrutiny and
monitoring that accompanies transparent decision-making
would serve a policing function, holding all of us responsible
for the good and for the bad decisions we make. The alterna-
tive is randomness and the reality is that most lotteries
employ subjective criteria already. 261 The, harm that can
result from combining substantive considerations with the
lottery is that the impact of the weighting effect of the sub-
stantive considerations is de-emphasized and the random-
ness, perceived as fairness, of the lottery is at the fore-
front. 262 Thus, attention is diverted away from the important
question of whether the chosen substantive criteria in any
way undermine the fairness and justice of the lottery.263
Furthermore, society's ability to police decision-makers and
their distributions is diminished because of the lack of
transparency. 264
Essentially, the distinction between rational decision-
making and random decision-making is not the use of subjec-
tive criteria accounting for desert, need, position, fitness, and
productivity because both mechanisms consider subjective
criteria. 265 The difference is that rational decision-making
259. The use of substantive criteria is vulnerable to criticism predicated
upon the choice of which criteria are assigned weight and which are not. Supra
notes 227, 239 and accompanying text.
260. See infra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
261. See infra Parts II.B and IV and accompanying notes (discussing
weighted lotteries).
262. Id.
263. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (stating that both choosing
incorrect criteria or choosing correct criteria but applying them incorrectly can
result in undesirable and irrational decisions).
264. See id.
265. See e.g., ELSTER, supra note 79, at 67.
There are two ways in which substantive criteria such as need,
productivity and merit can be used in combination with lotteries. First
they can be used to define the pool from which the random selection is
made or, less frequently, to eliminate some of the randomly chosen
candidates. I know of no lottery without some preselection or
postselection scrutiny on the basis of need, merit and the like.
Id. at 67-68 (emphasis added).
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promotes public dialogue and accountability in a way that
casting lots does not and has not.266
[E]ven where laws and institutions are unjust, it is often better
that they should be consistently applied. In this way those subject
to them at least know what is demanded and they can try to
protect themselves accordingly; whereas there is. even greater
injustice if those already disadvantaged are also arbitrarily
treated.267
Government must be accountable and responsible to its
citizens in allocating resources and responsibilities and
must not be perceived as an arbitrary decision-maker. 268
Accountability is not possible without transparent decision-
making; and, randomness does not promote transparency.
VII. CONCLUSION
The device of casting lots cannot be adjusted to account
for diverse types of difficult allocative decisions. 269 Argua-
bly, ignorance of the lottery's final outcome can reduce
incentive effects, 270 wasteful and dishonest behavior, by
those with discretionary power to alter their behavior in re-
sponse to nonrandom selection systems. 271 But, society
must not pretend that lotteries are unbiased or that they
generally result in unbiased distributions of resources and
burdens .272
The Antelope is a striking example of the attempt to use
casting lots to decide which Africans would receive the
benefit that, according to the law of the time, should have
accrued solely to those who had previously been captive on
board of the Exchange.273 The influence of the first- and
second-order decisions on the proposed weighted lottery
process certainly would have prevented the lottery from
266. See supra Parts III-V and accompanying notes.
267. RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS, supra note 137, at 141.
268. See RAWLS, supra note 141, at 51; supra Part II.B.
269. CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 3, at 44.
270. ELSTER, supra note 79, at 39 (defining incentive effects as essentially
motivation to engage in wasteful and opportunistic conduct).
271. Id. at 110-11.
272. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part II.
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being completely random but, even more importantly, it is
evident that the first- and second-order decisions would not
have resulted in a lottery that produced a distributively just
allocation.274 As discussed previously, distributive justice
fundamentally is about fairness and the minimization of
unjustified inequality. 275 Applying Rawls' "veil of ignorance"
theory, in their original positions none of the participants,
whether defined as the Africans or as the owners in the
relevant nation states, would have elected the casting of
lots knowing the severity of the burden imposed on the los-
ers. All likely would have preferred the mechanism adopted
by the Supreme Court as it afforded the greatest chance for
freedom.276
Likewise, in Belk, the pre-lottery criteria were sug-
gested, in combination with the lottery, as a way to redress
historical injustices that produced a segregated, dual public
school system. 277 Just as in The Antelope though, decision-
makers, unaware of their station in life, unaware of their
color, not knowing whether they could afford to privately
educate their children should they lose in the lottery, would
likely reject the casting of lots as a way to distribute such a
precious entitlement. What would they have opted for in-
stead? Perhaps such decision-makers, in their original
positions, would have chosen a different social and political
course in constructing their first-order choices so as to avoid
segregated public school systems and so as to provide ade-
quate public schools for all children, thereby obviating the
need to cast lots.
To the undiscerning, the lottery is a noble device that
makes the very difficult decision of who shall be freed, in
The Antelope, and which children shall benefit from poten-
tially life-changing educational experiences, in Belk. 278 The
more accurate view of casting lots is as a device that: (1)
274. See supra Parts III and IV (discussing first and second order decisions
and distributive justice, respectively).
275. See supra Part IV.
276. See supra Part II and accompanying notes.
277. See supra Part V.
278. The blind element of the lottery and the ability it affords to choose not
to choose are essential to the lottery; the blind element, however, also creates a
sense that participants are being treated as though interchangeable which often
leaves lottery losers feeling helpless. CALABRESI & BOBBIIT, supra note 3, at 134
(stating that the lottery offers a computer chance, not a human one).
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obscures the invidious effects of society's unwillingness to
engage in transparent and therefore responsible decision-
making,279 and (2) diverts attention away from the first-
and second-order decisions that necessitate tragic choices.




Case of the Antelope otherwise the Ramirez & Cargo,
May 11, 1821; Vol. 103, Minute Book 1816-1823, pp. 192-98;
Div. Savannah, Georgia; Off. Circuit Courts; Records Group
21, United States District Court; National Archives and
Records Administration-Southeast Region (Atlanta).
The subjects of the suits are the brig Antelope and her
cargo, consisting of about two hundred & fifty Africans. 1st
The parties are, Capt. Jackson suing on behalf of the
United States & the officers & crew of the Dallas cutter,
who claim the vessel and cargo as forfeited under the act of
the 20th April 1808, or under the modern law of nation, on
the subject of the slave trade 2, the Spanish vice consul who
claims the vessel and one hundred & fifty of the slaves in
right of the original owners Spanish subjects; 3d the
Portuguese vice consul who claims one hundred & thirty of
the slaves in behalf of the Portuguese owner from whom
they were captured: 4th an under claim of the captain &
crew of the Dallas cutter depending upon the event of
restitution to the Spanish and Portuguese claimants. There
was also a claim filed in the court below in behalf of John
Smith the captain of the Antelope who affected to command
her under the name of the General Ramirez by virtue of a
commission from General Artigas.
It appears from the evidence that the captain & crew of
the Antelope were originally of the ships company of a
privateer called the Columbia or Arrogonta sailing under a
Venesuelean commission. That in the character she entered
the port of Baltimore in the year 1819, & there
clandestinely and illegally shipped a crew of thirty or forty
men. That she proceeded to sea, hoisted the Artigan flag, &
prosecuted a cruise along the coast of Africa, during which
she took a number of negroes from Portuguese vessels, and
twenty five from an American vessel said to have been the
Exchange of Bristol, Rhode Island. That at length she fell in
with the Antelope having a number of slaves on board and
280. All words in the original documents contained in the Appendix are
spelled as they appear in such documents. Some spellings are considered
misspellings in the present.
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made prise of her as a Spanish vessel. To the Antelope all
the slaves were transhipped, & Capt. Smith was placed on
board her to command her under the name of the General
Ramirez as an Artigan privateer. The two vessels then
proceeded to the coast of Brazil obviously with a view to
effect a clandestine sale of the slaves, but here the
Arrogonta being shipwrecked, and her captain drowned, the
Antelope proceeded northwardly, and after vainly
attempting to sell the slaves among the islands at length
came off the coast of Florida for the [same object], for it
could be for no other. While off that coast she was [ ] to the
revenue cutter as a vessel of piratical appearance, and
Capt. Jackson *193 furnished with a reinforcement of
soldiers, proceeded to attack her. On boarding her and
finding her full of slaves and under command of a man
holding an American [ ], tho' professing to act as a
commissioned cruiser of Artigas took possession of her &
brought her into an American port for adjudication.
Under this view of the case the pretensions of the
several parties shall be considered.
And first, It is unquestionable that Capt. Smith cloak of
an Artigan commission could not protect him from the
penalties incurred in the relation of an American citizen.
Law would be nugatory if they would be thus evaded. The
relation between government and its citizens is founded in
contract, and the duties arising from that relation are not to
be arbitrarily dispensed with at the will of either party. If
therefore the case rested here there would be no difficulty
in adjudging the vessel forfeited for taking these Africans
on board at sea with intent to dispose of them as slaves. But
this, altho perhaps literally within the provisions of the
statute is obviously not within its intent and meaning. This
vessel while taking on her own cargo from the coast was not
an object of the laws of this government, and when
afterwards she came under the command of Smith it was by
violence. There was then a want of that actual or imputed
will and consent which is undespensible to constitute crime.
But as far as Smith had acquired an interest so far it is
obvious that the property became the subject of forfeiture
and this leads to the question what interest had Smith
acquired in her.
An actual belligerent capture does produce a change of
right and this is the foundation of the interest pretended to
by Smith. But here the reiterated decisions of the American
2005]
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courts apply, that a capture made under an American
illegal outfit is not belligerent, but void and producing no
change of right, and from this it follows that Smith had no
interest on which the forfeiture inflicted by law for this
offence could attach. And from these considerations it
results both, that under the statute no forfeiture attaches,
and that the original owners, whoever they were must be
restored to their preexisting interests.
But a much more sweeping principle is for the first time
[insisted] in this court, and it is contended that under the
modern law of nations *194 both the vessel must be
condemned and the slaves discharged as free, because the
trade is violative of the laws of nature and humanity and
the claimants have not shown that it was either sanctioned
or prosecuted, or prosecuted as sanctioned by the laws of
their respective countries.
It is true that the British courts of admiralty have of
latter years asserted a doctrine of this nature, & early and
long fostered habit still turns our attention towards British
decision, with a deviation scarcely consistent with judicial
or national independent mental subjection is perhaps the
last that man ever dares to throw off. But in this instance it
is not venturing beyond my usual limited pretense to
maintain that the British doctrine is altogether an
assertion of power and policy, and an interference in the
family concerns of others in which no nation has a right to
volunteer. I feel no inclination to justify or even [fralliate]
the trade. I thank God that I have lived to see it receive its
death blow. But it was from religion or policy, not from
national humanity that the blow was received. On the
contrary, British policy struggled against the effort to
abolish it, and all the effort of the Quakers the methodists
& W. Welberforce proved abortive until the [horrors] acted
in St. Domingo opened the eyes of government to
consequences that became political to guard against. From
that time philanthrophy like the [ ] up vapour began freely
to diffuse itself, & extended its spread even to the British
courts of vice admiralty.
Whenever a nation that has fostered its trade or
agriculture by dealing on slaves abolishes that trade it
becomes a matter of necessity that it should purchase
persuade or compel the discontinuance of it in other nations
for it is not only the profitable employment of shipping or
capital that is to be apprehended in fostering a rivals
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prosperity, but all the consequences flowing from a sensible
change in the price of labour to the prejudice of the country
that has relinquished the trade. And hence the Jamaica
planter of sugar & coffee could not have sustained a
competition with her rival of Cuba, or the Brasils while the
latter could procure slaves and the former could not unless
at a value enhanced by all the risks of smuggling.
That slavery is a national evil no one will deny except
him who would maintain that national wealth is the
Supreme national good. But whatever it be it was entailed
upon us by our ancestors & actually *195 provided for in
the constitution first received from the lord proprietors
under which the southern colonies were planted. During the
royal government it was fostered as the means of improving
the colonies and affording a lucrative trade to the mother
country; and, however revolting to humanity may be the
reflection, the laws of any country on the subject of the
slave trade are nothing more in the eyes of any other nation
than a class of the trade laws of the nation that enacts
them. On what principle is it then that a national court
which in a thousand instances has disclaimed all right to
notice the violations of the trade laws of other countries
should assert the right to prosecute and punish in this. The
truth is that a citizen has an interest even in the criminal
code of his own country; it is of his own making and the
only one he has consented to be bound by. What right have
I to punish the blow that is govern to another! In another
government it is usurpation, in the one offended against an
exercise of right. Nor can governments look with
indifference upon these encroachment upon their [ ] rights
and duties. Most of them retain the right of pardoning and
the benefit of forfeiture; with what justice can those rights
be superseded or appropriated by another. The vessel
condemned in the case of the [Amidie] (Acton 240) was at
that moment the property of the American government
under the act which attaches the penalty of forfeiture to the
foreign slave trade carried on by its citizen. And even if we
concede that under cover of the sacred cause of humanity
the British cruiser might have interfered so far as to break
up the voyage, it is difficult to find a justification for giving
either the vessel to the cruiser, or the slaves to his majesty.
But the court does not veil the grounds on which it found its
decision "We do [nor] (in the language of the Judge, and did
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at the time of this capture take an interest in preventing
that traffic in which this ship was engaged.
I must until better advised assume an opposite
language. Until some better reason can be assigned I must
maintain that it is a question altogether "inter alios"
whether the Spanish & Portuguese nations had authorised
the traffic in which their vessels were engaged. Not so as to
the American vessel I have a law to direct me as to that,
and the slaves taken out of her must be liberated. *196 I
would that it were in my power to do perfect justice on their
behalf. But this is now impossible. I can decree freedom to a
certain number, but I may decree that to A which is the
legal right of B. It is impossible to identify the individuals
who were taken from the American vessel. And yet it is not
less certain that the benefit of this decree is their right and
theirs alone. Poor would be the consolation to them to know
that because we could not identify them we have given
away their freedom to others. Yet shall we refuse to act
because we are not vested with the power of devination?
We can only do the best in our power, the lot must
decide their fate, and the Almighty will direct the hand that
acts in the selection. But I cannot consent to reduce this
number from twenty five to nine. For this depends upon
testimony that was interested to deceive, since in these
twenty five Smith could have no hope to sustain his claim,
tho he might succeed as to the residue. The reduction of the
number must therefore be averaged upon a scale with the
rest, and as they consisted of twenty three men & two boys
the lot must select them accordingly from the men & boys.
Some doubts have been stated as to the national
character of the vessel and as to the Spanish and
Portuguese interest in the slaves. On the vessel I entertain
no doubt, she was captured as Spanish and the evidence is
sufficient to prove the Spanish interest in her and the
slaves taken on board her must necessarily follow her fate.
But I am induced to think that the evidence preponderates
to prove that there were but ninety three and that number
also must be reduced by the general scale of loss.
Concerning the residue the evidence appears so
inconclusive that relunctant as I feel to keep the case open,
I cannot adjudge them to the Portuguese consul without
further proof.
The claim of Capt Jackson to salvage remains to be
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considered. On those adjudged to the government he of
course received his twenty five dollars per head. As to the
residue the principal difficulty is waived as it appears from
the decree below that it was admitted to be a case for
salvage & the quantum only remained to be adjusted. I will
content myself therefore with entering a caveat against this
being cited as an adjudged case. This vessel had not
incurred the forfeiture inflicted by the act under which she
has been libeled, and although Smith citizenship furnished
a reasonable *197 excuse for detention yet there is no
statue which in fact authorised her seizure and detention.
Our courts have restored property peaceably coming into
our port where the capture has been made upon illegal
outfits, but this has been altogether on general principles or
perhaps on early precedent. But they have never hitherto
sanctioned a seisure on the high seas on this ground. And it
would be difficult to say what course this court must have
persued if this prise had been claimed by a legal agent of
the Venezuelean public. It has not been so claimed and the
claim preferred under the Artigan commission has been
feebly sustained & ultimately abandoned. We are therefore
constrained to yield to the claims that have been preferred.
But as a right cannot grow out of a wrong, upon general
principles I will not stand committed to the decision that
this is in law a case of salvage.
In estimating the quantum of salvage I have felt all the
difficulties which the case presents. The interest in which
the salvors claim to participate is that which the owners
derive from their services. The slaves are not worth to the
owners the price which they would sell for hire, for the
owners receive them subject to all the expences risks &
inconveniences attendant upon the necessity of
transporting them to no one knows where. The real value
therefore cannot be ascertained by any prossible rule, it is
altogether a subject of speculation and as the salvage
cannot be raised by a sale, after paying their money it may
in the event turn out that they have paid it for nothing. Yet
they cannot get their property until every expence is paid.
All which considerations taken into view I cannot feel
myself justified in giving to the salvors more than fifty
dollars per head on all the negroes that shall finally be
actually restored to them from the custody of the law.
A decree to the following effect will therefore be
entered. That so far as relates to the vessel the decree of the
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district court be affirmed & so far as relates to the slaves
that it be reversed & annulled. That as to the slaves the
number taken from the American vessel the Exchange be
ascertained by a ratio stated from the whole number on
board the Antelope when she left the coast, the number
actually surviving when the separation takes place & the
number found on board the Exchange *198 and that the
number so found being seperated by lot among the men and
boys, the individuals thus selected delivered up to the
United States. That the residue be detained in the hands of
the marshal until the next term at which they shall be
divided by lot between the Spanish & Portuguese claimants
according as they shall make their several interests appear
on further proof.
That the sum of twenty five dollars per head be paid to
Capt Jackson & crew, according to law, on the number of
slaves delivered over to the United States, under this order,
and the sum of fifty dollars per head upon the residue
whenever they shall be delivered over but that the manner
in which this latter amount be distributed to the [ ] be
reserved for the future consideration of this court, on
hearing the parties.
And that the Spanish & Portuguese claimants pay all
costs (except those on the claim of John Smith) in the ratio
in which the slaves shall be finally divided among them.
But that the number which will result from the ratio to
ninety the Spanish claim may forthwith be established and
the slaves delivered over to the attorney in fact of the
claimant upon complying otherwise with this decree, &
giving bond to the amount of four hundred dollars per head
to take them forthwith out of the country and land them at
some permitted foreign port in a specified time to wit three
months after the date of the bond.
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United States of America
The President of the United States of America. To the
Honorable the Judges of the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Sixth Circuit and District of Georgia
Greeting:
Whereas, lately, in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Georgia before you, or some of you,
in a cause wherein Charles Mulvey Vice Consul of Spain &
others were Libellants against 150 African Negroes, Part of
the Cargo of the Vessel called the Antelope, otherwise
called the General Ramirez claimed by the United States
and also in a cause wherein Francis Sorrell Vice Consul of
Portugal and others were Libellants against 130, *134
African Negroes likewise part of the Cargo of the said
Vessel called the Antelope otherwise called the General
Ramirez claimed by the United States, a Decree was made
by the said Circuit Court in the words following [ ]. "That so
far as relates to the Vessel the Decree of the District Court
be affirmed, and that so far as relates to the Slaves, that it
be reversed and annulled. That as to the slaves, the number
taken from the American Vessel the Exchange be
ascertained by a ratio taken from the whole number on
board the Antelope when she left the Coast, the number
actually surviving when the separation takes place and the
number found on board the Exchange and that the number
so found being separated by lot from among the men and
boys, the individuals thus selected be delivered up to the
United States. That the residue be retained in the hands of
the Marshall until the next Term at which they shall be
divided by lot between the Spanish and Portuguese
Claimants according as they shall make their several
interests appear on further proof. That the sum of twenty
five dollars per head be paid to Captain Jackson and Crew
according to law, on the number of slaves delivered over to
the United States under this order and the sum of fifty
dollars per head upon the residue whenever they shall be
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delivered over, but the manner in which this latter amount
be distributed to the salvors be reserved for the future
consideration of this Court upon hearing the parties
interested; and that the Spanish and Portuguese Claimants
pay all costs (except those on the claim of John Smith) in
the ratio in which the slaves shall be finally divided among
them. But that the number which will result from the ratio
to ninety three the Spanish Claim may forthwith be
established and these delivered over to the attorney in fact
of the Claimant upon complying otherwise with this Decree,
and giving bond to amount of four hundred dollars per head
to take them forthwith out of the Country and land them at
some permitted foreign Port in a specified time, to wit,
three months after the date of the Bond." And at a
subsequent Term of the said Circuit Court, another and
further decree was made in said Causes in the words
following to wit: "Ordered and decreed that the residue of
the negroes imported in the General *135 Ramirez be
divided between the Spanish and Portuguese Claimants in
the ratio of one hundred and sixty six on behalf of the
Spanish Claimants & one hundred and thirty on behalf of
the Portuguese Claimants and that they be delivered up to
the agents of the Individuals as soon as their respective
powers of attorney shall be duly authenticated and filed
with the Clerk of this Court, and they shall respectively
comply with the Decretal order of this Court in paying the
expenses incurred on said negroes in the ratio above stated
and in giving bond & security as therein directed for
transporting them beyond the limits of the United States to
some permitted Port allowing however six months from the
date of the bond instead of three months as in that decretal
order specified & that the proceeds sales of the Vessel after
deducting the costs of Court exclusive of the Marshal's bill
for maintenance be paid over to the Spanish Claimant" as
by the inspection of the Transcripts of the Records of the
said Circuit Court which were brought into the Supreme
Court of the United States by virtue of two appeals
agreeably to the Act of Congress in such case made &
provided, fully and at large appears. And whereas, in the
present term of February in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and twenty five the said causes
came on to be heard before the said Supreme Court, on the
said transcripts of the Records, & even argued by Counsel;
On Consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion that
there is Error in so much of the sentence and decree of the
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said Circuit Court as directs restitution to the Spanish
Claimant of the Africans in the proceedings mentioned, in
the ratio which one hundred and sixty six bears to the
whole number of those which remained alive at the time of
pronouncing the said Decree, and also in so much thereof as
directs restitution to the Portuguese Claimant, and that so
much of the said Decree ought to be reversed and it is
hereby reversed & annulled; and this Court proceeding to
give such Decree as the said Circuit Court ought to have
given doth direct and order that the restitution to be made
to the Spanish Claimant shall be according to the ratio
which ninety three instead of one hundred and sixty six
bears to the whole number comprehending as well *136
those originally on board the Antelope as those which were
put on board that vessel by the Captain of the Arrogante
after making the apportionment according to this ratio, and
discounting from the number the rateable [lots] which must
fall on the slaves to which the Spanish claimants were
originally entitled, the residue of the said ninety three are
to be delivered to the Spanish Claimant on the terms in the
said Decree mentioned; and all the remaining Africans are
to be delivered to the United States to be disposed of
according to law; and the said Decree of the said Circuit
Court is in all things not contrary to this Decree affirmed.
You therefore are hereby commanded that such proceedings
be had in said causes as according to right and justice, and
the Laws of the United States ought to be had the said
appeal not withstanding. Witness the Honorable John
Marshall, Chief Justice of said Supreme Court, the first
Monday in February, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and twenty five.
J. Caldwell Deputy Clerk Sup. Ct. U. States
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The Africans of the Cargo of the Antelope or General
Ramirez
Tuesday, 9 May 1826
*180 On the motion *181 of the District Attorney in
behalf of the United States, it is ordered that the Spanish
Claimant in the above case do on or before the next Term of
this Court, designate by proof to the satisfaction of the
Court, the Africans of the above Cargo, not exceeding fifty
in number which by the decree of the Supreme Court of the
United States made at February Term 1825 and the
explanatory decree of the said Court made at February
Term 1826 the said claimant claimed to be entitled to. And
it is further ordered that in taking and procuring such
evidence the same Rules shall be observed and the same
notices given to the District Attorney as are usual in
regulating the taking of testimony in this Court.
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